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This thesis examines how the United States uses military assistance to 
influence the foreign and domestc policies of Egypt, one of the two leading 
recipients of U.S. security aid. While it is generally believed that arms transfers 
provide a patron state with influence over a client state's behavior, little evidence 
. has been provided to support this proposition. This research examines influence 
theory and the difficulties associated with the study of influence. Then it examines 
how the Foreign Military Sales (FMS),and the International Military Education and 
Training (I MET) programs serve as tools for the United States to exert influence. 
Finally, these programs are evaluated through an examination of Egyptian policy 
making during three historical periods which correspond to the presidencies of 
Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. The FMS program influences 
Egyptian behavior through the development of numerous U.S.-Egyptian personal 
relationships at all governmental levels and through Egyptian dependence on the 
United States for weapons, training, financing, and follow-on support. The I MET 
program influences the potential leaders of Egypt by providing students exposure 
to U.S. culture and values. U.S. influence efforts in the case of Egypt have been 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Security assistance provided to Egypt is heralded as a vital instrument of 
U.S. foreign policy. Egypt and Israel remain the two largest recipients of U.S. 
security assistance grants. Egyptian participation in the Camp David Accords in 
1979, logistical support for the U.S. hostage rescue attempt that same year, and 
participation in the U.S.-Ied coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991 are recent 
examples of U.S. influence derived from security assistance. Although the utility 
of security assistance as a source of U.S. influence is widely accepted, little 
research has been done to examine how security assistance programs actually 
influence the behavior of arms recipients. 
This research examines how the United States influences Egypt through the 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) programs. These programs are evaluated in terms of their capacity to 
provide the United States with influence over Egyptian policy during the Cold War. 
Based on U.S. Cold War experiences, the utility of arms transfers in the Post-Cold 
War environment is evaluated. 
The influence model utilized in this study identifies three types of influence; 
bargaining, structural, and hegemonic influence. Bargaining influence is the most 
direct type; it involves gaining leverage over specific issues of immediate concern 
to the patron. Structural influence differs from the influence derived from bargaining 
ix 
in that it occurs at a prior level, and attempts to avoid patron-client conflict. 
Through the use of structural influence, patrons attempt to create structural 
limitations which alter the behavior of an arms recipient. The last type of influence 
is unlike the other t'Ml types of influence. Hegemonic influence is not rooted in the 
transfer of arms. The goal of hegemonic influence is to co-opt the decision-making 
elites of a client state. Even while working within a well define influence model, 
influence may still be difficult to identify. 
Efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of attempts to influence client states are 
fraught with difficulties. Any attempt to exercise bargaining influence is heavily 
dependent on an actor's perception of other's intentions. The effectiveness of 
bargaining influence is also dependent on the credibility of the threats and 
promises of an arms patron. Furthermore, the publicly stated intentions of decision 
makers frequently do not represent their true intentions, and thus serve as an 
unreliable indication of influence. 
The FMS process in and of itself is a source of influence . The complexity 
of the FMS process, and the financial, contracting and managerial skills required 
to complete a major weapons sale, make arms recipients dependent on U.S. 
assistance. This extensive government-to-government involvement provides the 
United States with access to the political and military elites of a client state, and is 
believed to incur an obligation on the part of an arms recipient to support U.S. 
X 
policy objectives. Furthermore, the sophistication of modern weapon systems and 
equipment makes many less-developed nations dependent on follow-on support 
from the United States. 
The I MET program unlike the FMS program, is not a source of bargaining or 
structural influence, and does not involve the transfer of arms. The training and 
educational opportunities provided foreign officers and civilians holding government 
positions represent U.S. efforts at exerting hegemonic influence. The design of this 
program is based on the belief that exposing foreign students to democratic 
principles and the American way of life will influence the future decision-making 
process of a client state. 
U.S.-Egyptian security assistance relations are discussed in three historical 
phases coinciding with the Egyptian presidencies of Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat 
and Hosni Mubarak. These periods are chosen for analysis based on the dominant 
role Egyptian presidents have played in shaping Egyptian foreign and domestic 
policy. From this study the following conclusions and recommendations were 
derived with regard to U.S. efforts to influence Egyptian behavior through the FMS 
and !MET programs. 
The four basic elements of the FMS program which serve to influence 
Egyptian behavior are: 
• the development of personal relations at all government and military levels 
between the United States and Egypt, 
• the development of Egyptian dependence on U.S. weapons, 
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• the manipulation of arms delivery schedules and financing terms, and 
• Egyptian dependence on U.S. follow-on assistance. 
Unlike the FMS program, the IMET program represents a U.S. investment 
which will serve as a source of further influence. The IMET program influences the 
potential future leaders of Egypt through providing students exposure to the 
American lifestyle, training which stresses U.S. values, and fostering the 
development of close personal relationships between Egyptian students and their 
U.S. counterparts. 
In answering the research question - "How does the United States influence 
Egypt through the FMS and IMET programs? - " the efficacy of past efforts to 
influence Egypt are examined. This research identifies the following four elements 
which have effected the success of U.S. influence: 
• the existence of mutual interests between the U.S. and a client state, 
• lack of consideration on the part of a the United States for the negative 
impact compliance will have on a client state, 
•limitations on the ability of the United States modify client behavior, and 
• the ineffectiveness of security assistance at achieving long term goals or 
promoting the continuation of existing behavior. 
The United States continues to view security assistance as a valuable means 
to achieve U.S. objectives. However, questions persist as to its utility. The 
influence derived through the transfer of military hardware and training is an issue 
that requires additional research to expand the available knowledge in the field. 
xii 
Based on the belief that grant security assistance produces a greater level 
of influence than that derived from cash sales of arms, the case of Egypt should be 
an optimal case. Since 1988 annual security assistance grants to Egypt have 
averaged $1.3 billion dollars. In light of the magnitude of these annual grants of 
aid to Egypt, additional research is warranted to study whether the United States, 
especially in time of slow economic growth. 
Historically, the United States appears to have achieved a constant level of 
influence over Egyptian behavior. However, there is little evidence in general 
supporting U.S. influence of Egyptian behavior. Additionally, tt)ere appears to be 
no correlation between the amount of arms transferred to Egypt and the influence 
obtained. Steady increases in the dollar amount of arms transferred to Egypt have 




Security assistance provided to U.S. Middle Eastern allies has been 
portrayed as a vital instrument of U.S. foreign policy. As part of a much broader 
security assistance nel'M>rk, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and the International 
Military Educational and Training (IMET) programs are designed to meet the 
legitimate security needs of recipients, and to serve as a source of U.S. influence. 
Egypt has been one of the principal recipients of U.S. security assistance since the 
late 1970's. Egypt and Israel are unique in that they are the two remaining nations 
W'lich annually receive over one billion dollars of U.S. security assistance grants. 
Egypt receives an average of $ 1.3 billion of grant assistance each year.1 
Arms acquisition is driven by real or perceived national security 
requirements. In the anarchic self-help global political system, the capacity of a 
nation to defend itself is the sine qua non of any state's concerns. 2 National 
survival, sovereignty, and the perpetuation of the government in power is 
dependent on a nation's ability to defend itself from internal and external threats. 
Nations which do not possess the indigenous resources with which to satisfy 
1 Richard Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 
1984-1991," DISAM Jouma/15, no. 1 (Fall1992): 30. 
2 Statement by Molly K. Williamson, Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asian 
Affairs, 103rd Gong., 3rd sess., 11 May 1995 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 
1995): 7. 
1 
internal and external security requirements are driven to meet these needs through 
trade with foreign powers. The willingness of Egypt to devote increasingly scarce 
resources to the procurement of arms and training underlines the importance this 
nation places on acquiring advanced military weaponry and technology, and thus 
provides the United States with the opportunity to exert influence. The goal of this 
study is to examine how the United States influences Egypt through the FMS and 
IMET programs. 
The arms trade is not a new phenomenon, but U.S. use of arms transfers as 
an instrument for influencing the behavior of other nations began after the Second 
World War. Since the advent of modem weapon systems in the nineteenth century, 
less industrialized countries have acquired much of their military capability through 
trade. 3 The international arms trade has evolved from what is referred to as the 
.. merchants of death .. era from 1930 to 1940 (a period characterized by a lack of 
government controls on private arms manufacturers) to the present system in which 
governments serve as primary actors. 4 During the "merchants of death" era, few 
arms transfers were used for for political or diplomatic purposes.5 It was not until 
the Post-World War II period that nations began to view the arms trade as a source 
of influence over the political and military behavior of recipient states. The advent 
3 Edward Laurance, The International Arms Trade (New York: Lexington 
Books, 1992), 3. 
4 1bid., 59. 
5 Ibid., 62. 
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of national controls effectively brought the laissez-faire international arms trade 
system to an end . Growing awareness of the intense political significance of the 
arms trade has led governments to become increasingly involved in its control and 
regulation. The United States has come to regard arms transfers as an integral 
element of U.S. foreign policy. 
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has utilized 
security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy. The weapons and training 
provided to U.S. allies and friends in the early post war period, began in response 
to perceived threats to the United States and its Western European allies from 
communist expansion. Early security assistance was provided primarily to the 
U.S. war ravaged European allies from existing post-war stockpiles. By the 1950's, 
The U.S. security assistance program had expanded to encompass many of the 
newly emerging third world countries of the Middle East, in an effort to gain client 
states, and halt Soviet expansion. 
Historically, U.S. military assistance has been used as both a carrot and a 
stick. Promises of continued military assistance encouraged Israel and Egypt to 
sign the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords. However, U.S. security assistance has 
also been utilized as a stick with which to punish countries whose policies run 
counter to U.S. interests. The U.S. resupply of Israeli forces during the three Arab-
Israeli wars from 1967-1973, served not only to support· a U.S. regional ally, but 
also provided a form of punishment for Egyptian alignment with the Soviet Union. 
3 
1. Research Objectives 
Through an examination of the U.S. International Military Education and 
Training, and Foreign Military Sales programs, this thesis will answer the following 
questions: (1) How does the United States influence Egypt through the FMS and 
IMET programs? (2) How do these programs support our Cold War regional 
interests? (3) Do they offer the same utility with regards to supporting our Post-Cold 
War interests? 
2. Case Selectivity and Methodology 
This thesis addresses the research objectives though the analysis of U.S. 
arms transfers to Egypt. The security assistance relationship between the United 
States and Egypt is examined in three historical phases. These phases 
correspond with the terms of Egyptian Presidents Gamal Nasser (1954-1970), 
AnwarSadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-1994). For the purpose of this 
study, the concept of influence will be defined as the ability of one country to 
exercise a degree of control over the policy of another through the supply of arms 
and training, but also as the ability to affect the decision making process of security 
assistance recipients. Influence with regard to military assistance includes, but is 
not limited to, the explicit manipulation of the flow of arms to effect policy changes 
4 
on the part of the recipient. Influence can also be manifest in the form of 
governmental policy decisions which take into account the "anticipated reaction" of 
an arms supplier. 6 
The basic methodology utilized is content analysis. A survey of pertinent 
official documents, pronouncements and secondary sources was utilized as the 
basis for determining U.S. foreign policy and objectives as they pertain to the 
Middle East, along with those of Egypt. The level of U.S. influence over Egypt is 
measured in terms of their participation in the Middle East peace process, support 
of U.S. regional initiatives, and demonstrated respect for human rights as compared 
with the level and type of security assistance provided. 
3. Organization of Study 
The subsequent sections of this chapter lay the foundation upon which the 
remainder of the this thesis is constructed. Section B of this chapter discusses 
influence theory. This section outlines the ambiguity associated with many of the 
key terms encountered in the study of influence, and establishes working 
definitions. Additionally, the difficulties associated with evaluating the presence of 
influence or its effects are considered. Finally, the influence model which is utilized 
in this study to evaluate U.S. influence in the case of Egypt is defined. The 
rationale for the selection of this model is also discussed. 
6 William Quandt, Arms Transfers to the Third World (Boulder: Westview, 
1978), 122. 
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Chapter II outlines the evolution of U.S. Security Assistance programs, while 
highlighting the development of the FMS and I MET programs. The FMS process 
and the I MET program are discussed in terms of how they serves as instruments 
with which the U.S. exerts influence. Section 8 provides a historical overview of 
U.S.-Egyptian relations. The final section of this chapter presents an overview of 
U.S. security assistance provided to Egypt under the FMS and IMET Programs in 
terms of magnitude from 1952 to 1994. 
The security assistance relationship between Egypt, and the United States, 
is divided into three distinct phases. Chapter Ill addresses the first phase, from 
1952 to 1970. This chapter discusses the evolution of U.S. foreign policy 
objectives from the Truman to the Nixon administrations, Egyptian foreign policy 
under Nasser, and the level of U.S. security assistance provided during this period. 
The chapter concludes with an evaluation of U.S. efforts to influence Egyptian 
foreign and domestic behavior. 
Chapter IV discusses the second phase of U.S.- Egyptian relations, from 
1970 to 1981. An analysis of this phase encompasses the study of the evolution 
of U.S. foreign policy objectives from the Nixon to the Reagan administrations, and 
Egyptian foreign policy under Sadat. The efficacy of U.S. efforts to influence 
Egyptian behavior will also be discussed. 
Chapter V examines the final and current phase of U.S.-Egyptian relations. 
The evolution of U.S. foreign policy from the Reagan to the Clinton administration 
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is examined, along with Egyptian foreign policy decisions as shaped by Egyptian 
President Mubarak. 
Chapter VI presents a summary of the findings of this thesis and proposes 
recommendations for future U.S. security assistance. One of the chief findings is 
that there is a general lack of evidence supporting U.S. influence of Egyptian 
behavior. One of the chief recommendations is that greater study is required of the 
relationship between arms transfers and U.S. influence. 
The logical starting point for a thesis 'Aihich evaluates how the United States 
influences Egypt is an examination of the concept of influence. A basic knowledge 
of influence theory, and the conceptual model utilized in this study is essential. 
There exists a multitude of conflicting theories and models 'Aihich attempt to explain 
how one nation influences the behavior of another. 
B. INFLUENCE THEORY 
Any meaningful study which analyzes how the United States has attempted 
to influence Egypt through the FMS and I MET Programs must be conducted within 
the confines of a defined conceptual framework. Along with working within a well 
defined framework, any study must acknowledge many of the limitations which 
accompany the study of influence. Most seasoned diplomats would argue that the 
influence derived from arms transfers is apparent, and does have major benefits for 
the United States, the world's leading arms supplier. 7 Furthermore, arms transfers 
7 Keith Krause, "Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and 
American Arms Transfer Relationships," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 3 
7 
have been categorized as the single most weighty diplomatic instruments in the 
hands of major powers. 8 Although these may be commonly held beliefs, they are 
based on a multitude of different understandings of how states attempt to exercise 
influence through the manipulation of security assistance in conjunction with other 
toots of foreign policy. 
A key factor 'Atlich adds to the complexity of the study of security assistance 
as a source of influence is the ambiguity associated with the fundamental terms 
identified with this study. The inability to clearly define terms such as influence, 
power and leverage adds to the existing conceptual chaos. For the purpose of this 
study influence is defined as the "ability of a patron state to affect the foreign and 
domestic behavior of a recipient country to further the interests of the patron. "9 The 
term "power'' is often used interchangeably with the term "influence". Power is most 
commonly defined as the capacity to influence the behavior of other states in 
accordance with one's own objectives. 10 Implicit in this definition, is the 
understanding that without the exercise of power, other states will not accede to the 
demands made upon them. The last term, leverage, as it applies to security' 
assistance, is defined as the ability to threaten the discontinuation of a security 
8 1bid. 
9 Gabriel Marcella, "Security Assistance Revisited: How to Win Friends 
and Not lose influence," Parameters 12, no. 4 (December 1982): 21. 
10 John Spanier, Games Nations Play, sixth ed. (Washington, D. C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1987), 164. 
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assistance relationship unless American interests are given preeminent weight. 11 
Even if these definitions are universally accepted, additional analytical questions 
persist. These persisting analytical caveats introduce a degree of uncertainty into 
any apparent claims as to the efficacy of arms transfers as a source of influence. 
These important analytical caveats include the absence of definitive evidence, 
dependence of influence on the intentions of patrons and clients, and the 
realization that an actor's perceptions of others intentions are more critical than the 
intentions themselves. 12 
Realizing the conceptual and mythological pitfalls which exist, the analysis 
of U.S. derived influence through the provision of security assistance in the case 
of Egypt will be examined in terms of three distinct operational influence models. 
These models distinguish three dimensions of influence sought by patron states: 
bargaining influence, structural influence, and hegemonic influence. The influence 
model selected for this thesis is based on Keith Krause's discussion of how arms 
transfers are used as tools of statecraft.13 The Krause model was chosen for its 
clearly defined three part structure. Its structure incorporates, and facilitates the 
categorization of past U.S. efforts to influence Egypt. Use of this model not only 
11 Arthur A Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in 
International Relations (Ithaca: Comelf University Press, 1990), 166. 
12 Krause, "Military Statecraft," 316. 
13 Ibid., 313-336. 
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highlights how the United States attempts to influence arms recipients, but also 
serves as a means with which to analyze the efficacy of U.S. arms transfers. 
1. Bargaining Influence 
Bargaining influence involves gaining leverage over specific issues of 
immediate concern to the patron. This is the most direct means of attempting to 
exercise influence. It follows the carrot and the stick approach in which clients are 
manipulated through either threats of punishment or promises of rewards in order 
to achieve the specific goals dictated by the arms supplier. The means that have 
been used have varied from actual or threatened arms embargoes, to precipitous 
decreases or increases in levels of military aid, to cancellations of contracts, to 
delays or accelerations of deliveries, or to the promises of future transfers. 14 
Bargaining influence has been utilized to affect the signing of peace treaties, 
cease-fires, troop withdrawals, and participation in coalitions and treaty 
organizations. 
Although widely utilized by patron states, numerous major difficulties are 
associated with attempts to influence clients through bargaining. The effectiveness 
of bargaining influence is dependent on the credibility of threats and promises. If 
a client state views a patron's threats or promises as Jacking credibility, the patron's 
ability to gain influence through bargaining is severely degraded. The second 
difficulty associated with bargaining influence is related to the nature of influence. 
14 Ibid., 317. 
10 
The ability to exert influence may not lie solely in the hand of a patron state. Clients 
may retaliate by exercising .reverse influence. Reverse influence may be the 
product of a client's lobbying efforts within a patron state, or may be manifest in the 
form of promises or threats. Rather than to repeatedly capitulate to an arms 
supplier, a client may attempt to insulate itself against future punishment by finding 
an alternate supplier. Any attempt to exercise bargaining influence is heavily 
dependent on an actor's perception of others' intentions. The inherent difficultly 
associated with evaluating an actor's true intentions compels actors to rely on their 
own perceptions of other's intentions. Additionally, even in light Qf the presence of 
existing threats of punishment, or promises of rewards, the significance of mutual 
interests cannot be discounted. A major difficultly encountered when one attempts 
to identify bargaining power is that the type of evidence necessary to prove the 
existence of a causal relationship in many cases does not exist. As has been 
previously alluded to in terms of the importance of perceptions, the publicly stated 
intentions of decision makers frequently do not represent their true intentions, and 
thus serve as an unreliable measure. 
2. Structural Influence 
Structural influence differs from the influence derived from bargaining in that 
it occurs at a prior level, and thus attempts to avoid a patron-client conflict over 
specific goals. Structural influence facilitates the achievement of both specific or 
general objectives by altering the policy choices of an arms recipient without the 
visible exercise of influence. Through the application of structural influence, 
11 
patrons attempt to create structural limitations which alter the behavior of an arms 
recipient. This goal can be achieved either by altering the threats a client faces, or 
through the expansion or contraction of the range of possible options open to a 
client in the face of a perceived threat. Arms transfers which alter the regional or 
local balance of power represent a method of altering the threat a client faces. In 
security assistance relationships, structural power can also be exercised by 
providing or withholding specific types of weapons and training that facilitate or 
inhibit certain military strategies. TVJO methods of detecting structural influence are 
counter factual history and shifts in the arms acquisition patterns of client states.15 
3. Hegemonic Influence 
Hegemonic influence, unlike bargaining and structural influence, is not 
rooted in the transfer of arms. The goal of hegemonic influence is to co-opt the 
decision-making elites of a client state. Through the willing acceptance of the 
patron's views by the ruling elite of a client state, the perceived interests of clients 
and patrons converge. 16 This form of influence is not associated with the 
achievement of specific or general goals, but rather is used in support of global 
interests. The United States attempts to exercise hegemonic influence through the 
IMET and E-IMET Programs. Through these programs the United States attempts 
to sociatize the 'IJ\IOrld view of participants, in the hope that participants of these 
15 lbid., 322. 
16 Ibid., 325. 
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programs will rise to positions of prominence. Once in a position of national 
leadership, it is assumed that a participants Americanized views will direct the 
decision making process of a recipient nation so as to converge with that of the 
patron. 
For the purpose of this study, U.S. efforts to influence the foreign and 
domestic behavior of Egypt will be evaluated in terms of the bargaining, structural, 
and hegemonic influence models. The following chapter examines the mechanisms 
with which influence is sought through the International Military Training (I MET) 
program and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. Facets of each of these 
programs will be identified in terms of what type of influence the United States 
attempts to wield. Subsequent chapters will examine the utility of U.S. i_nftuence 
efforts, in terms of the role both these programs play, while remaining cognizant of 
the intrinsic limitations which exist with regards to establishing casual relationships. 
13 
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II. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: PROGRAMS AND MOTIVATION 
This chapter presents a brief discussion of the evolution of U.S. security 
assistance efforts, followed by a description of both the FMS and JMET programs. 
Through gaining an understanding of the complexity of the FMS process, the level 
of involvement on the part of both the United States and potential arms recipients, 
how the United States attempts to influence recipients can be identified. The 
discussion of the FMS program is completed with a brief review of the mechanisms 
incorporated within the FMS process which serves as an instrument for achieving 
influence and applying leverage. The second part of this section reviews the 
objectives of the IMET and E-IMET programs, along with how these programs are 
designed to provide foreign military officers with training which supports U.S. 
interests. 
A. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
International military assistance has been an integral part of U.S. security 
policy for more than fifty years. Originating with special programs of military aid to 
the Philippines and Western Europe in 1946, Greece and Turkey in 1947, and 
Nationalist China in 1948, the multitude of military assistance efforts of the U.S. 
government vvere finally united in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. As 
outlined by this act, military assistance was viewed as "essential to enable the 
United States and other nations dedicated to the principles of the United Nations 
15 
to participate in arrangements for individual and collective security. "17 Out of these 
altruistic goals emerged a more pragmatic rationale for providing U.S. security 
assistance. The United States provides security assistance to protect its vital 
interests and enhance its national security. During the Cold War U.S. vital interests 
centered around the containment of the Soviet Union. Aid provided to Greece and 
Turkey was initially designed to frustrate Soviet attempts to expand into the 
Mediterranean. Through a U.S. offer of military assistance, Truman hoped to entice 
Greece and Turkey into a pro-western security alliance. From its modest post 
WWII origin, U.S. security assistance efforts have continued to expand in both 
scope and in the objectives which they strive to achieve. 
Military assistance has become a valuable instrument of U.S .. national 
security and foreign policy. It helps strengthen friends and allies so they can play 
a larger role in maintaining the status quo in their region, defend themselves 
against aggression, or participate in peace-keeping activities. The United States 
provides security assistance through a range of programs that allow friends and 
allies to acquire U.S. equipment, services, and training for legitimate self-defense 
and for participation in multinational security efforts, such as coalition warfare. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. security can no longer be viewed 
in terms of maintaining the upper hand in the East-West power struggle. The 
17 William H. Lewis," Political Influence: The Diminished Capacity," in 
Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., Arms Transfers in the 
Modern World (New York: Praeger, 1979), 188. 
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increased interdependence of states, and the breaking down of national and 
international boundaries, has created an international system which is beyond the 
control of any one state. The emerging role of coalitions as primary actors in the 
international system underlines the importance of U.S. security assistance efforts 
which serve to strengthen U.S. friends and allies. 
In the current international system, the line between U.S. foreign and 
domestic policy has effectively evaporated. The post-Cold War international 
environment highlights the importance of security assistance as a vital instrument 
with which to guarantee national security. U.S. national security can no longer be 
viewed solely in terms of defending our borders. National security includes 
protecting the American way of life. With the growing complexity of world politics 
and dwindling world resources, our ability to maintain the American way of life is 
dependent on the actions of other states. President Truman's observation that 
"our security is shaped by the character of foreign regimes," is as applicable today, 
as it was over forty years ago when he first pronounced it. 
Along with understanding the evolution of U.S. security assistance efforts, 
it is important to be familiar with the U.S. security assistance programs which have 
been categorized as a vital instruments of U.S. foreign policy. 
1. Foreign Military Sales Program 
The Foreign Military Sales Program is one of the two key U.S. security 
assistance programs defined as a source of U.S. influence. Through a 
understanding of the program's origin, and the FMS process, the strength of this 
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program as an instrument for exerting U.S. influence can be evaluated. Although 
derived from the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which was developed after 
World War II, the accomplishments of the current FMS program must be viewed 
in term of its relatively brief existence. 
a. Origin 
The Humphrey Morgan Act - International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA), served as the legal foundation upon 
which the FMS Program was constructed. Under the provisions of the AECA, the 
United States is authorized to sell defense articles and services to allies and 
friendly foreign governments, in accordance with the restraints and controls 
specified by law, and in the furtherance of the security objectives of the United 
States. 
b. Process 
The sale of U.S. defense articles or defense services, though the 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program is a lengthy process encompassing an 
elaborate system of U.S. government involvement. The extent of government 
involvement in the FMS process is demonstrated by the manpower devoted to it. 
As of 1994, 2,085 U.S. government civilian employees and 5,766 U.S. contract 
employees were involved in the planning and implementing of U.S. mflitary sales 
in 105 countries. 18 The complexity of the FMS process in conjunction with 
18 William W. Keller, Arm in Arm: The Political Economy of the Global 
Arms Trade (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 53. 
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numerous possible procedural variations at each step of the negotiating and 
implementing process makes each FMS case unique. Government-to-government 
Foreign Military Sales involves a relationship between the United States and a 
recipient government in which the United States acts as a contracting agent. The 
U.S. government purchases security assistance articles from suppliers and then 
provides them to foreign governments. The nature of a request and the military 
department which has cognizance over the defense articles or services will 
determine the exact procedures followed in each specific FMS case. However, all 
cases contain a number of basic elements. 
Forward Planning: The forward planning which may occur before a country 
submits a specific request, serves as the foundation upon which a supplier-recipient 
relationship is developed. The U.S. government, as the potential contracting agent, 
assists prospective recipients in determining their security assistance needs along 
with related U.S. budgetary and procurement issues. The assistance provided to 
a buying country at this preliminary stage is provided through three separate 
planning tracks. These tracks are delineated as the country track, budget track, 
and procurement track. The country track involves the regional departments of the 
State and Defense Departments, the operating branch of the Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA), the Commanders of the Unified Commands of the 
Armed Forces responsible for the area involved, and the Security Assistance Office 
(SAO) in the interested country. The "budget track" involves DSAA's Plans Branch, 
the Office of Management and Budget, and at the State Department, the Under 
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Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology (Stateff), and 
Political-Military affairs (State/PM). The "procurement track," includes the 
State/PM, the individual services, DSAA Operations and Plans, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and the National Disclosure Policy Committee. 19 
The actual planning is carried out by two types of groups: the 
"Country Team" or SAO of a particular country, and the 'Washington Team", which 
may be a consultative or survey team dispatched for a particular reason, or 
associated with a Joint Military Commission.20 
A key planning tool is the Annual Integrated Assessment for Security 
Assistance (AIASA), prepared by the Country team. Additional planning documents 
include Consolidated Data Reports (CDRs). These reports contain abbreviated 
AIASA information for use in the Congressional Presentation Document (CPO), 
produced as part of the annual budget process. The CPO is an annual account of 
the security assistance requirements of selected countries. 21 
Eligibility: The first step in all FMS cases is a determination of eligibility. Any 
nation wishing to buy or tease defense articles or services, whether through FMS 
or commercial sales, must meet the requirements delineated in the U.S. Arms 
Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976. The AECA stipulates that the United States 
19 Michael Collins Dunn, ''The Life History of a Foreign Military Sale," 




may sell or lease defense items to friendly countries solely for four stated purposes 
: (1) internal security, (2) legitimate self-defense, (3) participation in regional or 
collective security arrangements, and ( 4) enabling foreign military forces to 
construct public works in support of economic and social development. 22 
Additionally, the statue invests the Executive Branch with the 
responsibility of approving a nation's eligibility. In practice this is a function 
delegated to the State Department. In conjunction with the aforementioned 
eligibility requirements, recipient country or organization must agree not to transfer 
title to or possession of any defense related article, service or training to a third 
party without Presidential approval. Additionally, the country must provide the 
same degree of security protection to purchased defense articles as afforded such 
article in United State's. 23 
Types of Requests: Once a country's eligibility is established, an initial request 
will be made. Initial requests can be made to the State Department, or the 
Department of Defense from a foreign embassy, or in regular meetings between 
government officials. Initial requests, although often initially informal, are the basis 
for determining the precise channels thought which the negotiations will proceed. 
Following an initial inquiry, a formal Letter of Request (LOR) is submitted. FMS 
requests, depending on the nature of the equipment requested, are either 
22 Dunn, "The Life History of a Foreign Military Sale," 9. 
23 lbid., 8. 
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categorized as "Requests for Significant Military Equipment (SME), or "Requests 
for all Other Foreign Military Sales."24 SME refers to equipment listed in the United 
States Munitions List as requiring special export controls because of their 
substantial military utility or capability.25 Requests for SME are sent to both the 
State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) and the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). Although there is no required format for a 
LOR, in cases were SME is requested, the request must address a number of 
fundamental issues. These issues include: why the nation needs the equipment 
requested, how it will affect its force structure, the reaction of neighboring countries, 
the ability of the buyer to operate the equipment, the source of financing, "relevant 
human rights considerations," and W'letherthe U.S. government should approve the 
transfer.26 All other FMS requests, except SME will be routed to the cognizant DOD 
component. 
P&R and P&A Data: Once the initial request is received though the appropriate 
channel, potential buyers may request either Planning and Review (P&R) data, or 
Price and Availability (P&A) data. P&R data is preliminary data, while P&A data 
is more detailed, and offers precise cost estimates and delivery timetables. DOD 
components are expected to provide P&R data within 45 days of receipt of the 
24 The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The 
Management of Security Assistance, 3rd ed. (Dayton: Wright-Patterson AFB., 
1982), ch. 8, p. 1. 
25 Dunn, ''The Life History of a Foreign Military Sale," 12. 
26 lbid. 
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request, and P&A data should be provided within 60 days of receipt of the request. 
Unlike P&R data, and because of its precise nature P&A may be incorporated in a 
Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). 
The LOA: The LOA is the document used as the actual sale transaction. This 
document lists the items or services, estimated costs and any conditions of the sale. 
In cases where requested items require a long lead time and require financing, a 
Letter of Intent (LOI) will be issued to cover the period between the issuance of the 
LOA and official acceptance. After the LOA is completed, the LOA will undergo an 
extensive review process by relevant agencies. 
Final Review of LOA: Prior to finalization a completed LOA is reviewed by various 
appropriate agencies. In the Defense Department, the comptroller and the legal 
counsel of the relevant ''component" are automatically involved. The DSAA 
Operations Directorate (DSAA/OPS) is the main coordinator for all FMS actions, 
and directs any DSAA action required prior to the point when the document is ready 
for "countersignature." The actual review process varies on a case-by-case basis. 
The nature of the defense items and services requested, the monetary value of the 
sales package, mode of payment and the source from which sales items are drawn, 
determine the review process. 27 
Congressional Oversight: Until 197 4, the povver to negotiate and approve arms 
transfers resided almost exclusively with the President. In 197 4, the legislative 
27 Ibid., 12. 
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branch took its first step towards establishing congressional oversight of the FMS 
process. With the adoption of the Nelson Amendment to the Foreign Assistance 
Act, Congress received a limited veto power over major FMS transactions. While 
the Executive Branch has retained the responsibility of determining FMS recipient 
eligibility, the U.S. Congress maintains the power to block proposed FMS sales. 
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, with the 
incorporated Nelson Amendment, was the first comprehensive piece of legislation 
to establish formal policy guidelines for the FMS Program.28 The AECA gave 
Congress the power to block arms sales, by passing a concurrent resolution of 
disapproval. Furthermore, the AECA requires the Executive Branch to formally 
notify Congress if a proposed FMS sale meets prescribed thresholds. Section 36 
(B) of the AECA defines the thresholds above which Congress must be notified to 
include; 
• any LOA which includes defense articles and services totaling $50 million 
or more, 
• requested design and construction services of $ 20 million or more, 
• or any "major defense equipment " for $ 20 million or more. 29 
In cases where prescribed thresholds are met or exceeded, the 
President must notify the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
28 lbid., 41. 
29 Michael Collins Dunn, "Arms and the Congress," Defense & Foreign 
Affairs 14, no. 4 (April1986): 14. 
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Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by numbered certification. 
Once Congress has been formally notified of a pending transaction, the House and 
Senate have thirty days in which to debate the proposal. If, after thirty days, 
Congress adopts a concurrent resolution opposing the sale, the transaction is 
nullified and the State Department must negotiate a new agreement with the 
purchasing government. 30 If there is not concurrent resolution the transaction 
becomes legal and binding. 
The expanded role of Congress in the security decision making 
process has increased the ability of Washington to influence client states. A 
potential arms recipient must not only convince the Executive branch of the benefits 
to the United States of a proposed arms sale, but also the Congress. The 
requirement for congressional approval of all major arms sales strengthens 
Washington's bargaining position. Additionally, foreign lobbying efforts which may 
accompany controversial arms sales serves to acquaint foreign governments with 
the U.S. political system, functioning as a source of hegemonic influence. 
FMS Case Implementation: Once a foreign buyer finds the offer acceptable, the 
purchaser must complete and sign the LOA's acceptance portion, date it, and 
forward the copies to the military department, as well as an additional copy to the 
Security Assistance Accounting Center (SAAC). Upon receipt of the LOA, SAAC 
issues the obligation authority (OA) to the cognizant DOD component. The 
30 Michael T. Klare, American Arms Supermarket (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1984), 72. 
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procurement and logistical aspects of delivery are as complex as any other stage 
of the process and require significant further interaction between representatives 
of the buying country and their U.S. counterparts. A FMS case is not considered 
closed until all items and services listed in the LOA have been shipped and billed, 
when all bills containing these items and services have been paid, and when SAAC 
issues a ''Final Statement" attached to the next quarterly bill officially closing the 
The FMS process from the time a LOR is submitted to the time a 
"Final Statement" is issued can take as long as two to three years, depending on 
the specifics of the case. During this time representatives of the client state work 
hand in hand with a large team of U.S. government representatives. These U.S. 
personnel guide the client nation in determining their security needs, and lead them 
step by step through the complex FMS process. Additionally, U.S. Government 
personnel provide the procurement and management skills, which in many cases 
the client nations is incapable of providing for itself. It is this dependency 
relationship that develops between the United States and a cfient state as a result 
of the complexity of the FMS process that is a significant source of influence. 
Beyond this source of implicit influence, other aspects of the FMS process provide 
the United States with additional sources of influence. The next section of this 
chapter discusses the influence derived from the FMS process in greater detail. 
31 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The 
Management of Security Assistance, 3rd ed., ch. 8, p.15. 
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c. Sources of Leverage and Influence 
The transfer of major weapon systems and high-tech equipment 
through the FMS Program, offers the United States the opportunity to influence the 
political behavior of recipients. The capacity of the U.S. government to apply 
influence and leverage as a function of the FMS program is a product of the arms 
sale negotiation and contracting process, as well as the nature of the defense 
articles and services that are sold. Through the FMS program, the United States 
attempts to: 
• gain access to the political and military elite of a client state, 
• develop an obligation on the part of arms recipients to support U.S. policy 
objectives, 
• establish military-to-military ties, 
• and make arms recipients dependent on the United States. 
The long and often complex negotiations, which are characteristic of 
the FMS process, provide U.S. officials with the opportunity to establish close 
working relationships with their foreign counterparts. Out of these close working 
relationships grow friendships and allegiances, which often yield significant future 
returns. In counties such as Egypt, where military elites wield considerable political 
power and influence, the development of enduring relationships are particularly 
important. 
Through major arms sales the United States attempts to directly and 
indirectly influence arms recipients. The transfer of advanced munitions are 
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believed to create a bond between the parties involved, implying a commitment on 
the part of supplier to defend the recipient. In turn for this implied commitment to 
defend the recipient, the recipient incurs an obligation to support the policy 
objectives of the supplier. 32 
The sophistication of modem vveapons systems and equipment makes 
many less developed nations, dependent on follow-on support from the United 
States. The ties which are established when a. nation purchases advanced 
weapons was adeptly stated by Lockheed Vice President William D. Perreault, 
when he said, ''When you buy an airplane, you also buy a supplier and a supply 
line; in other VvOrds you buy a political partner."33 The dependency which 
accompanies many weapons purchases can be the source of significant. coercive 
potential. The ability of an arms supplier to influence a recipient's behavior is 
greatest during times of crisis and or war. This is especially true in instances when 
the rapid resupply of vital war materials means the difference between victory and 
defeat. 
Arranging large-scale loans or grants is yet another service which is 
usually only available through a govemment-to-govemment sale. The current world 
recession has significantly reduced the funds available to many Third World nations 
for the acquisition of costly new munitions. Since the end of the Cold War, the 
32 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 30. 
33 Ibid. 
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United States has come to dominate the Third World arms market. Many Third 
World countries cannot pay cash for weapons, but still have a military or political 
desire for acquiring advance weapon systems. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
left the United States as one of the few remaining states capable of providing 
financing for major defense purchases. Financing has become an integral element 
of Foreign Military Sates, and a source of considerable leverage. The United 
States attempts to influence the behavior of arms purchasers by offering favorable 
credit terms at the time of sale. Unlike FMS financed through grants, FMS financed 
through a U.S. financed loan offers the United States the opportunity to influence 
recipients for years after the sale of a V~eapon system. Through refinancing and 
loan restructuring, the United States can alleviate the financial burden imposed by 
loan repayment to arms recipients faced with financial shortfalls. 
Government-to-government weapons sales are not the only method 
by which the United States attempts to shape the behavior of security assistance 
recipients. The training of foreign military officers has been categorized as one of 
the most cost effective means with which to influence the foreign and domestic 
policies of client states. Section two of this chapter discusses both the I MET and 
E-IMET programs. These programs serve as the vehicles through which 
International military students, and more recently their governmental counterparts 
receive U.S. training. 
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2. International Military Education and Training Program 
The United States has a long history of providing military training to its 
friends and allies. Since the earliest days of the MAP program, the provision of 
training has been seen as an essential element of the security assistance "total 
package approach." It was recognized early on, that the provision of military 
hardware alone does not guarantee the increased operational readiness of military 
aid recipients. As the training element of the MAP program developed, and later 
evolved into the IMET program, U.S. military training began to be seen as a 
valuable source of hegemonic influence. 
a. Origin 
The International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program 
provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from aflied and 
friendly nations. The current I MET program evolved out of what was formerly the 
Military Assistance Program (MAP). The MAP provided both grant military 
equipment and training to U.S. allies and friends. The training element of MAP 
focused on providing technical training which was directly related to the support of 
grant MAP equipment. The demise of the MAP in 1976, represented a fundamental 
shift in U.S. international military training efforts, and subsequently led to the 
development of IMET. The IMET program took on an expanded thrust, 
concentrating on providing training for individual students, not especially coupled 
to military equipment deliveries. The I MET program was developed in response 
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to the requirements outlined in the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which was 
subsequently amended in the Fiscal Year 1976 Congressional Presentation 
Document (COP). Section 543 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
identifies three intended purposes of the I MET program: 
(1) to encourage effective mutual beneficial relations and increased 
understanding between the United States and foreign countries in 
furtherance of the goals of ·international peace and security; 
(2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their 
resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained 
by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby 
contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries; and, 
{3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries 
participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally 
recognized human rights. 34 
Additionally, the IMET program was established in response to a U.S. 
government initiative to standardize the training of international military students receiving 
training in the United States. The initial IMET program focused on providing professional 
leadership, and management training to a select group of junior, middle and senior grade 
foreign officers . 35 The overall goal of the IMET Program was to strike a balance between 
providing technical courses that a poorer country could not purchase, and professional 
"influence-building " training appropriate to the level of development of the country 
involved and the sophistication of the country's armed forces. Since 1950, the IMET 
34 Spiro C. Manolas, ''The United States International Military Training 
{IMET) Program: A Report to Congress," DISAM Journa/12, no. 3 (Spring 
1990): 24. 
35 Janet Seufert, "International Military Student Program", DISAM Journal 
16, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 87. 
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program and its predecessor programs have furnished education and training for over 
500,000 international military students from nearly 150 countries. The number of students 
trained under the IMET program alone, however, fails to illustrate the potential of this 
program, the selectivity of program participants serves to magnify the impact the program 
has on participating nations. U.S. professional military training , serves as an integral step 
in the career paths of many foreign officers and conversely a stumbling block for others. 
The successful completion of a U.S. military course enhances participants' potential for 
advancement In a six-year period, FY 1984-FY 1989, over 1 ,000 former IMET students 
held such key positions as Heads of State, Cabinet Ministers, Ambassadors, Members of 
Parliament and Chief Executive Officers of leading business enterprises, as well as chiefs 
of their military services, military commanders, academy superintendents, foreign attaches, 
and senior NATO military officials. 36 The I MET Program appears to help the United States 
reach and influence thousands of individuals who ultimately rise to positions of 
prominence, either in the government, or in the private sectors of their nations. As with 
other security assistance programs, the fMET program has evolved and expanded. 
3. Expanded IMET Program 
The expanded IMET Program is part of the overall I MET Program, but is different 
from the traditional I MET Program which emphasizes military-to-military ties. Expanded 
IMET trains military and civilian officials, including civilian personnel from non-defense 
ministries, the country's legislative entities, and non-governmental agencies who are 
36 Manolas, ''The United States International Military Education and 
Training Program,"4. 
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involved in military matters, in managing and administering military establishments and 
budgets, in promoting civilian control of the military, and creating and maintaining effective 
military justice systems and military codes of conduct in accordance with internationally 
recognized human rights. 37 The objectives of the Expanded I MET Program include: 
• contributing to responsible defense resource management, 
• fostering greater respect for and understanding of democracy and civilian rule of 
law, including the principle of civilian control of the military, 
• improving military justice systems and promoting and awareness and 
understanding of internationally recognized human rights.38 
The training and education provided to foreign military officers and civilians under 
the IMET and the E-IMET programs represents a long term investment in a client state, 
\M'lichthe United States hopes will yield future influence. These programs in their current 
form are based on the belief that exposing foreign students to democratic principles and 
the American way of life will influence the future decision making process of a client state. 
The goals of the IMET and E-IMET programs have steadily grown since the United 
States first began providing foreign students training and educational opportunities. . 
Early training programs focused on instructing students in the operation of U.S. military 
equipment, however, have expanded to include educational courses ranging from financial 
management to civil-military relations. While the efficacy of these programs continues to 
be accepted, there has been little serious study of actual program effectiveness. 
37 U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Expanded /MET Handbook. 
38 lbid. 
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Two significant considerations must be taken into account with regards to any 
attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of these two programs. The first consideration is the 
time span required for U.S. influence efforts through the IMET Program to come to 
fruition. It may take a foreign officer trained under the IMET program, several years to 
reach a position of prominence. The second consideration that must be taken into 
account is that any U.S. attempt to track the professional progress of foreign officers 
trained in the United States could easily prove to be counterproductive. Even in semi-
open societies, such as Egypt, any attempt to stay in contact with, or gather information 
on past students trained under the IMET program can easily be viewed as a threat to 
Egyptian sovereignty. 
The IMET program \Nhile characterized as a cost effective source of U.$. influence, 
requires a longer period of observation. It has only been since 1980, that annual Egyptian 
participation in the I MET program has exceeded fifty students. 39 Furthermore, in view of 
the limitations associated with evaluating program effectiveness, further study is required. 
While the FMS and I MET programs serve as instruments of foreign policy, the success 
or failure of U.S. influence efforts can not be viewed solely as a result of these two 
programs. 
The history of U.S. - Egyptian relations, discussed in the last section of this chapter, 
provides the final building block of the foundation upon which the Egyptian security 
39 Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military 
Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts: As of 
September 30, 1992 (Washington, D.C.: FMS Control and Reports Division 
Comptroller, DSAA, 1992), 99. 
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assistance case is developed. The importance of gaining a fundamental understanding 
of the history of U.S.- Egyptian relations was clearly articulated by John C. Campell in his 
discourse on the connection between history and a nations foreign policy: 
We cannot decide upon objectives and policies in the abstract and then 
expect to apply them in some mechanical way. It is largely a question of 
direction, of day-to-day decisions made in accordance with a consistent 
general approach, in light of the region itself. Certain forces and trends 
should be apparent. It is our task to estimate them correctly, to guide and 
control them as we can; to march with them when they are favorable, and 
deflect them when they are not; to ride the tides of history and not be 
submerged by them. 40 
The foreign and domestic policy decisions of a nation are not made in a vacuum. Egyptian 
foreign policy has been shaped by it leaders, along with economic, social, religious and 
cultural forces. Through the study of the history of U.S.- Egyptian relatiqns these forces 
and trends can be identified. 
B. U.S.- EGYPTIAN RELATIONS (1952-1994) 
Any study of Egypt inevitably involves a study of geopolitics and regional conflicts. 
Egypt occupies a strategic position as a land bridge between two continents, and a link 
between two principle waterways,. the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Egypt 
is a country of over sixty-four million, and contains over half of the world's Arabs. This fact 
has historically placed the leader of Egypt in contention for leader of the "Arab World." 
Egypt's geographical position in the world has repeatedly placed the nation between 
outside powers vying to influence Egyptian foreign policy. 
40 John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American 
Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960), 6. 
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Soon after the conclusion of World War II, Egypt emerged as a sought after prize 
in the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. 
concerns over expansionist policies of the Soviet Union, led to the formulation of National 
Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68). NSC-68 represented a radical shift in U.S. global 
defense doctrine and capabilities. fn accordance with the goals outlined in NSC-68, the 
United States attempted to develop mutual security agreements in the Middle East in 
efforts to halt Soviet expansion. The Anglo-American concept of a Middle East Command 
(MEC), with Egypt as one of its principle members, was an early attempt at incorporating 
Egypt in an Anglo-American Middle East security strategy. 
Modern Egyptian history and the evolution of U.S.- Egyptian relations are but a 
reflection of regional cOnflicts. Military failure has historically been the force which 
motivates change in Egypt. The formation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the 
subsequent war for Israeli independence, served as a catalyst of change in Egypt. The 
poor performance of the Egyptian Army against the fledgling State of Israel in the 1948 
War, produced discontent in the Egyptian Army, and resulted in the formation of the 
Egyptian Free Officers movement. The Egyptian officer corp blamed the Army's poor 
performance on the faulty military equipment supplied by the corrupt government of King 
Farouk.41 There are some allegations not only of Washington's participation in the coup, 
but of attempts by the United States, without the knowledge of the British, to reorient 
41 David R. Tarr and Bryan R. Daves, eds., The Middle East (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1986), 141. 
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regional politics. Kermit Roosevelt, is said to have given Lieutenant Colonel Nasser, a 
prominent member of the Free Officers, three million dollars with which to implement the 
coup.42 After the successful coup, the members of the young Free Officers movement 
appointed General Muhammad Naguib as the leader of Egypt's ruling Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC). On September 3, 1952, President Truman, made a public 
statement which expressed broad support for the new Egyptian government, and hinted 
at American readiness to provide military aid to the Free Officers.43 General Naguib 
indicated to the United States, that he was willing to except U.S. influence in exchange for 
weapons. On September 18, 1952, Lieutenant Colonel Abdel Amin, delivered a message 
from General Naguib, to the American ambassador in Cairo. The message stated that 
Egypt was completely on the side of the United States, and utterly apposed to communism. 
Furthermore, Naguib was willing to exchange Egyptian membership in the proposed 
Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), in exchange for military and financial 
assistance. In October, Nasser presented the Assistant Secretary of Defense, William 
Foster, with a $100 million military shopping list. In response to the Egyptian request, the 
United States initially agreed to sell Egypt ten million dollars 'NOrth of equipment, however, 
the State Department withdrew the offer the next day. The U.S. offer was withdrawn 
because Amin refused to provide earlier agreed upon assurances. In 1954, Gamal Abdul 
42 Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992), 
26. 
43 William J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt; 
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Nasser won his two year power struggle with General Naguib, and became the head of the 
RCC. 44 Nasser's rise to power retarded U.S.-Egyptian relations, and effectively nullified 
all earlier agreements. Continued U.S. support of the Free Officers Movement was seen 
as means of reviving American influence in the Arab world. From 1945 to 1966, Egypt 
went from being a monarchy, greatly influenced by its former protector, the United 
Kingdom, to becoming an independent nationalistic Arab state vying to regain its previous 
position as leader of the Muslim World. Under Nasser, Egypt pursued a foreign policy of 
non-alignment. Egypt attempted to exploit the superpower rivalry in the Middle East, by 
playing the interests of both superpowers against each other. One of Nasser's first 
objectives after taking power was the strengthening of the Egyptian military. However, 
limited Egyptian industrialization and severe financial constraints made any military 
modernization plans dependent on the procurement of foreign military aid. The 
revolutionary regimes quest for modern weaponry provided credibility to an active 
Egyptian foreign policy, served as a symbol of Egyptian independence and reinforced the 
authority and legitimacy of the regime. However, the Egyptian non-alignment policy 
proved to be incompatible with procurement of U.S. economic and military aid. Two 
conflicting attitudes developed in Washington and Cairo, with regards to foreign aid. 
Nasser perceived the existence of an obligation on the part of foreign donors, including 
the United States to provide Egypt with economic and military aid. Washington, however, 
believed that acceptance of U.S. aid also included acceptance of implied U.S. influence. 
44 Hellen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: 
Library of Congress, 1991 ), 58. 
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Israeli retaliatory raids into the Gaza Strip, in which Egyptian forces suffered a number of 
casualties, effectively substantiated Egyptian perceptions of the threat posed by Israel. 
Heightened Egyptian security concerns served to bring to the forefront the opposing 
attitudes of Egypt and the United States, with regards to the nature of security assistance. 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, perceiving a legitimate security threat to Egypt, 
sought Western arms and training to restore the regional military balance. 45 However, 
under the 1954 Mutual Security Act, recipients of U.S. military aid were required to make 
binding commitments to the United States, guaranteeing that American weapons would 
be used for legitimate defense and internal security. Additionally, a congressional 
mandate required that U.S. arms transfers be accompanied by a Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG), tasked with supervising the transfer and accounta.bility for the 
proper use of American weapons. 46 In September, 1955, Egyptian reluctance to accept 
U.S. arms transfer terms resulted in the withdrawal of Egypt's request for U.S. military aid. 
Nasser viewed the United States' military aid policy as symptomatic, and designed to 
isolate and weaken Egypt. Unfortunately, President Eisenhower failed to heed the warning 
of the British Foreign Minister Bevin at the london Conference five years earlier. Bevin 
stated that the Arabs must be allowed to purchase the arms necessary to meet their 
legitimate security needs, realizing that if Western powers refused to sell arms to the 
45 Tarr and Daves, The Middle East, 69. 
46 Bums, Economic Aid and American Policy Towards Egypt; 1955-1981, 
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Middle Eastern states, the Soviet Union would surely do so. 47 As had been predicted by 
Bevin, Nasser, in an effort to thwart the imposition of U.S. influence agreed to purchase 
vveapons from the Soviet Union, through Czechoslovakia. This action served to trigger a 
sequence of events. Egyptian procurement of Soviet weapons was viewed by the United 
States as an Egyptian move towards alignment with the Soviet Union, and Jed to the 
withdrawal of a U.S. offer of financial support for the Aswan Dam project on July 19, 1956. 
A week later, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, presumably in effort to gain the revenue 
from the canal, to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam , subsequently triggering the 
Suez Crisis. 48 Israel responded to Egyptian provocation by attacking across the Sinai 
Peninsula on the evening of October 29, 1956. Israeli action was followed by preplanned 
British and French response aimed at regaining control of the Suez Canal. Israeli actions 
in conjunction with British and French attacks on the canal, rapidly overwhelmed Egyptian 
forces. The Suez Crisis, although representing a major military loss, was viewed as a 
moral victory for Nasser. After the setbacks suffered by Egypt in the 1956 War, Nasser 
attempted to demonstrate Egypt's ability to implement an expanded foreign policy, through 
Egyptian involvement in the Yemen Civil War in 1962. Egyptian support of Yemeni rebels 
was in direct opposition to U.S. support of loyalist forces. From 1963, to 1965, Egyptian 
troop concentrations in Yemen increased to 80,000, however, inadequate training and 
equipment for Yemen's rugged mountain terrain was blamed for the failure of Egyptian 
47 Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez, 20. 
48 Tarr and Daves, The Middle East, 142. 
40 
forces. The psychological setback suffered by the Egyptian Army, threatened to produce 
the same discontent in the officer corp that had previously resulted in the formation of the 
Free Officers Movement. Perhaps the most damaging consequence of Egyptian 
involvement in the civil war in Yemen, was that it increased Egyptian dependence on 
Soviet military aid, and tied down Nasser's best troops far from home at the advent of the 
1967 War with Israel. An Israeli surprise attack across the Sinai on June 5, 1967, and the 
subsequent fighting proved devastating to Egypt. Eleven years as a recipient of Soviet 
training and weapons proved to be of little vaiue with regards to Egypt's ability to repel 
foreign aggression. The 1967 War, resulted in the destruction of the Egyptian Air Force, 
and the overwhelming of Egyptian ground forces in less than twelve hours of fighting. 
Morale in the Egyptian Army plunged to its lowest point since the 1952 military takeover. 
The 1967 War, served as a turning point in Egyptian-Soviet relations. After the August, 
1967, summit of the Arab League in Khartoum, Egypt became the recipient of financial aid 
from the Arab oil producing states. Nasser began to distance himself from the Soviet 
Union, although, Egypt continued to remain almost completely dependent on Soviet 
sophisticated military hardware. 
It was not until after the death of Nasser, and the advent of the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War that Egypt actively attempted to move towards aligning itself with the United States. 
In May of 1971, Anwar Sadat signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in order to 
guarantee continued Soviet support. However, by late 1972, he called for the removal of 
all20,000 Soviet military advisors and technicians. Almost immediately after announcing 
his desire for the removal of Soviet personnel, Sadat secretly contacted the Nixon 
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Administration. On October 6, 1973, Egypt launched an ill-fated attempt to regain the 
Sinai. Sadat's attempt at regaining the Sinai, though unsuccessful, was not as costly as 
the 1967 War. Once again the failure was attributed to arms, the Soviet Union's failure 
to properly prepare the Egyptian military, and provide timely resupply shipments of 
advanced weapons, was delineated as the cause of Egypt's failure. The 1973 War, 
convinced President Sadat, that his greatest hope of regaining lost Egyptian territory lay 
with the United States at the bargaining table. 
The current phase of U.S.-Egyptian relations originated in the early 1970's.49 
Although, Egypt turned to the United States with political and economic objectives in mind, 
the provision of security assistance quickly became an integral element of emerging U.S. 
- Egyptian relations. U.S. efforts to forge peace between Egypt and Israel, ultimately 
resulted in the United States arming both former belligerents. U.S. arms sales became a 
reward for the pursuance of an Egyptian foreign policy that supported the peace process. 
Progress in the Middle East peace process was reflected in the rapid expansion of FMS 
to Egypt. After the signing of the Camp David Accords, Egypt and Israel were rewarded 
with U.S. arms credits. By offering Egypt, U.S. V~eapons, along with a co-production 
agreement, the Carter Administration hoped to convince Sadat to sign an agreement 
granting the U.S. Air Force access to Egyptian airfields. Although, failing to grant U.S. 
forces official access to Egyptian bases, Sadat did however, promise to provide access 
on a case by case basis. Major General Click D. Smith, in a report to Congress stated that 
49 William B. Quandt, The United States and Egypt (Washington D. C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1990), 13. 
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in late 1979, the United States was given secret access to a former British fighter base in 
the desert of southern Egypt. From this staging site, the April, 1980, attempt to rescue the 
Americans being held in Iran was launched. Additionally, the base has been used as a 
training site for U.S. electronic surveillance and air combat-control crews. 50 In 1981, Egypt 
officially agreed to allow the United States Rapid Deployment Force to use Egypt's base 
at Ras Banas, in the event that a friendly nation needed help to repelling an armed attack. 
The level of cooperation between Washington and Cairo at this time was further 
demonstrated in Egyptian logistical support for an American program which provided arms 
to the Afghan mujahideen during the war in Afghanistan. 51 Throughout the 1980's, the 
United States attempted to influence the behavior of the Egyptian government through 
increased arms deliveries, and by providing Egypt with American MAAGs. 
Two episodes in the 1980's, served to highlight the level of development of the 
relationship bel'M:!en Washington and Cairo. The first episode was the Israeli invasion of 
southern Lebanon in 1982, and the second episode was the Achille Lauro hijacking in 
1985. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June of 1982, a watershed event in the Middle 
East, created strains in U.S.-Egyptian relations. 52 Israeli implication in the massacre at 
the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps, led Egypt to recall its ambassador to Israel in 
protest. They however, did not break off diplomatic relations. Although faced with regular 
50 Richard Halloran," U.S. Tells of Secret Air Operations in Egypt," New 
York Times, 24 June 1983, p. 9. 
51 Quandt, The United States and Egypt, 33. 
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Congressional pressure, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, did not appoint a new 
ambassador until 1986.53 The hijacking of an Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro on 
October 7, 1985, off the coast of Egypt, served as another test of the depth of U.S.-
Egyptian relations. An Egyptian attempt at transporting the hijackers to Tunis, to stand 
trial by the PLO was thwarted by the United States. U.S. action was taken after U.S. 
officials learned that Leo Klinghoffer, a wheelchair bound Jewish American, had been 
killed by the hijackers. American F-14 fighter aircraft intercepted an Egyptian commercial 
aircraft transporting the Achille Lauro hijackers over the Mediterranean. The Egyptian 
aircraft was forced to land in Sigonella, Italy, where Italian authoriti~s took custody of the 
hijackers.54 This episode served as a source of friction between both governments. 
However, both countries were able to continue a dialogue of friendship, although Egypt 
didn•t like our actions and we were unhappy with some of their efforts. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 proved to be a significant test of U.S. interests 
in the Middle East, and of the utility of arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy. 
The Gulf crisis reaffirmed the utility of U.S. arms transfer policy with regards to Egypt. The 
cost of the Gulf War 'M:>uld have been much greater to the United States, if it had not been 
for active Arab participation. In support of the U.S. led coalition, Egypt sent 35,000 troops 
to Saudi Arabia. Egypt•s troop commitment was only second to that of the United States. 
Egyptian participation in the anti-Iraq coalition was considered critical, in that it provided 
53 Ibid., 9. 
54 Quandt, The United States and Egypt, 22. 
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political cover for U.S. intervention. As a reward for Egyptian participation, the Bush 
administration canceled all outstanding Egyptian military loans held in the United States. 
In addition, to this significant financial windfall, Egypt was granted permission to purchase 
$2 billion in new U.S. armaments on credit. 55 
Through examining the history of relations between Egypt and the United States, 
past Egyptian efforts at balancing conflicting national interests become apparent. Egyptian 
dependence on foreign military assistance and apprehension of foreign influence have 
presented Egypt with a significant foreign policy challenge. By gaining an understanding 
of how Egypt has historically attempted to satisfy these conflicting requirements, U.S. 
efforts to influence Egypt thought the FMS and IMET programs can be better evaluated. 
The last section of this chapter presents a brief overview of U.S. security assistance that 
has been provided to Egypt throughout the three phases of U.S.-Egyptian relations. 
C. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO EGYPT (1952-1994) 
1. FMS Program 
Egypt first completed notable U.S. Foreign Military Sales agreements in 1954. Early 
sales agreements were more symbolic than substantial. They represented U.S. good will. 
Significant military sales to Egypt, in terms of magnitude, were not negotiated until after 
1976. Total sales agreements from 1950 to 1975, only totaled approximately $350,000. 
The level of U.S. security assistance provided to Egypt as a function of FMS agreements 
rose during the late 1970's. This marked increase in U.S. assistance, was paralleled by 
55 William D. Hartung, And Weapons For All (New York: Harper Collins, 
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Egyptian progress in its peace talks with Israel. While the peace process was viewed as 
mutually beneficial to Egypt and Israel, U.S. influence derived from arms transfers 
accelerated the peace process by encouraging Egypt to sign a less than optimal 
agreement. The 1980's witnessed a general decrease in magnitude FMS agreements 
between the United States and Egypt. The decline in level of U.S.-Egyptian FMS 
agreements during the 1980's can be attributed to prevailing international economic 
conditions. U.S. military sales agreements experienced another period of growth from 
1988 to the advent of the Gulf War. Following the Gulf war, there was a brief increase in 
the level of FMS agreements, followed by a period of decline, and the current period of 
leveling off. Figure 4-1 sho\IVS the corresponding fluctuations in U.S. FMS agreements with 
Egypt. An important aspect of FMS agreements that must be recognized, is ~hat there is 
no direct correlation betvveen the magnitude of the FMS agreements signed, and the actual 
delivery of material or services in a given year. Figure 4-2 depicts actual FMS delivers to 
Egypt from 1976 to 1994. The large disparity in these two sets of figures, raises the 
question, as to "Whether promises of assistance, or actual delivery of material provides the 
most influence. Fluctuation in both FMS agreements, and actual deliveries, can be 
viewed as a U.S. attempt to exercise bargaining and structural influence over Egypt. 
The success or failure of U.S. influence efforts is not solely a function of the 
magnitude of FMS. It is for this reason that the utility of FMS as a source of influence is 
discussed in Chapters Ill, IV and V, after the development of U.S. and Egyptian foreign 
policy is discussed. 
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Source: DSAA Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military 
Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1994, p. 2. 
47 
FMS Deliveries 
The Case of Egypt 
Figure 4-2 
Source: DSAA Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military 
Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1994, p. 16. 
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2. IMET Program 
Egypt has a long history of receiving professional military training from foreign 
sources. At the end of the American Civil War, Ismail Pasha, Khedive of Egypt hired 
Thaddeous Mott, an ex-colonel in the Union cavalry, to recruit fellow veterans as advisors 
to the Egyptian Army. Mott brought an experienced cadre of military men to Egypt, 
including six ex-generals, for the purpose of providing training to Egyptian staff officers. 56 
More recently, from 1955 to 1973, the Egyptian military was the recipient of Soviet 
training. President Hosni Mubarak, once a career Air Force pilot, received his military 
training in the Soviet Union. 
Egyptian military officers started receiving U.S. training, under the IMET program 
in 1978. Wtth the exception of two peak years in 1982, and 1983, in which the number of 
Egyptian students training exceed three hundred and thirty, the number of students 
receiving training has remained relatively constant. Figure 4-3 depicts the level of Egyptian 
student participation in the IMET program. 
56 Joseph P. Engelhardt, "Civil War Americans in Egypt," DISAM Journal 
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Ill. PHASE I (1952-1970) 
This chapter examines the first historical phase of U.S.-Egyptian security 
assistance relations. The motivating forces of both Egyptian and U.S. foreign policy 
are discussed, along with the level of U.S. security assistance. U.S. efforts to 
influence Egyptian foreign and domestic behavior through arms transfers are then 
evaluated. 
A. U.S. FOREIGN POUCY FROM TRUMAN TO NIXON 
The primary concern of the United States in the Middle East after 1947, was the 
potential Soviet threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its southern neighbors, 
and hence to Western interests in the region. 57 From 1952-1960, U.S. Middle East policy 
was developed in the context of the emerging Cold War. The American foreign policy 
objectives pursued during this period can be defined in terms of the presidential doctrines 
which were developed. These commitments to contain Soviet influences and various 
attempts to make them operational, in tum constituted the core of American polices toward 
the Middle East in the postwar era. The first of these doctrines was the Truman doctrine. 
The 1947 Truman Doctrine provided the foundation for what was later defined as the pOlicy 
of containment. The focus of the Truman Doctrine was provision of military aid to Turkey 
and Greece in effort to hold Soviet expansion During this period U.S. concerns centered 
around guaranteeing the territorial status quo in the Middle East, limiting the extension of 
Soviet influence and avoiding dislocations that would have adverse repercussions for the 
57 Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Retrospect and prospects: Forty Years of US 
Middle East Policy," Middle East Journal 41, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 9. 
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Western alliance. Additionally, President Truman, through sponsorship of the 1951 Middle · 
East Command, or defense organization, attempted to establish a link between NATO and 
an alliance of Arab countries headed by Egypt. Although Truman's attempt to establish 
the MEC failed, attempts to extend the Western alliance into the Middle East continued 
under the Eisenhower presidency. Eisenhower, sensing a lack of commitment for 
containment in the Arab world, formulated a new region defense arrangement , the 
Baghdad Pact, among the Northern Tier states in effort to block Soviet expansion. 
However, events of the 1950's, allowed the Soviet Union to leap over the "Northern Tier'' 
of Middle Eastern states, and establish close relations with Egypt. With the breach of the 
"Northern Tier" by the Soviet Union, came the Eisenhower doctrine. This doctrine 
represented a U.S. pledge to commit armed forces to protect the integrity of any Middle 
Eastern nation requesting assistance against an overt attack by any state controlled by 
international communism. 58 During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, U.S. Middle 
East strategy proved to be inconsistent, especially in the case of Egypt. Kennedy 
demonstrated a sincere desire to establish better relations with the Arab nationalists, such 
as Egypt, while by 1966, the Johnson Administration, followed a policy of non-cooperation 
with Egypt. This policy reflected Johnson's impatience with Nasser's involvement in the 
Yemen Civil War. 59 
58 Ibid., 15. 
59 Ibid. 
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Although, this phase of Egyptian-U.S. relations, encompassed the strategies of five 
U.S. presidents, the foreign policy goals of each presidency were based on common 
objectives with regards to the Middle East. These commonly shared objectives were, the 
continued support for Israel, containment of the Soviet Union through the formation of 
regional military alliances, maintaining the status quo in Middle East, promoting Arab-
Israeli peace, drawing Egypt out of the Soviet sphere of influence, and maintaining access 
to the regions natural resources. 
Although, the Truman Administration attempted to utilize military aid as an 
instrument of foreign policy, establishing a precedent for its use by subsequent 
administrations, it was never vievved as a vital tool, or the only tool. Military and economic 
assistance offers were alternately made to Egypt, however, their use pro~ed to be of 
insufficient magnitude to be an effective tools of foreign policy. The following section 
examines U.S. security assistance provided to Egypt under Nasser. 
B. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NASSER 
As has been discussed earlier, the ability of the United States to influence an arms 
recipient's behavior is dependent on U.S. intentions and objectives, as well as those of the 
patron state. The origin and factors influencing Egyptian foreign policy decisions must not 
be viewed through a western prism. Egyptian foreign policy, like that of other actors in the 
international system is influenced by the country's geography, history and culture. 
However, unlike other nations, Egyptian leaders since independence, have ·played a 
dominant role in the foreign policy decision making process. Egyptian leaders have 
enjoyed exceptional latitude in the formation of foreign policy compared to the rulers of 
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developing countries generally, and other Arab countries in particular. 60 The ability of 
Egyptian leaders to exercise virtual absolute rule, is rooted in the administrations of the 
ancient pharaohs. This "Pharaonic Core," once necessitated by Egyptian geographic 
constraints, serves to legitimize modem Egyptian authoritarian rule. A major 
consequence of the foreign policy role played by Egypfs ruling personalities is that formal 
institutions like the parliament, political parities, and even the foreign affairs bureaucracy 
are relegated to playing an insignificant part. Although domestic, economic and political 
forces are important, they do not drive Egyptian foreign policy, in the same way they do 
in many developing countries. Since the rise to power of Abdel Gamal Nasser, some of 
the boldest diplomatic strokes have been made not because of political and economic 
pressure, but despite them.61 The evolution of Egyptian foreign policy is best analyzed 
in terms of the personal goals of its ruling personalities. It is for this reason that Egyptian 
foreign policy is discussed in relation to Egypt's presidents, Abdel Gamal Nasser, Anwar 
Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. 
Abdel Gamal Nasser personified Egypt. Through understanding Nasser, one gains 
a better understanding of the history, culture, and the way in which Egyptians wish to view 
themselves in the Arab ~rid. The Egyptians are a proud, homogenous people, politically 
and culturally sophisticated, deeply conscious of their continuous existence as a nation, 
60 Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search 
for National Identity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 21. 
61 Ibid., 22. 
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dating back to earliest history.62 Nasser's vision of an Arab world under Egyptian 
leadership, was the product of seven thousand years of Egyptian history, and two 
thousand five hundred years of foreign occupation. Egypt's most recent experiences, 
while under seventy-four years of British domination caused Egypt to embark on a search 
for a national identity. An important result of Egyptian experiences while under foreign 
domination, is the intense fear Egyptians harbor of being tied to a colonial master. This 
opposition to extraterritorial rights is one of the most deep-seated strands of continuity in 
Egyptian policy, its roots are grounded in centuries of foreign rule dating back to the 
Ottomans and their more recent struggle with the British in the Suez Canal Zone. The 
1948 Palestine War was the crucible in which Nasser's vision of Arab unity was formed. 
Beyond being the spark that ignited the fires of Arab unity, the war highlighted the critical 
·importance of Egyptian security in the area of the Fertile Crescent, and led to Nasser 
believing that Egypt should play a more dominant role in the region. The Egyptian foreign 
policy which emerged after the 1948 war, focused on Egyptian influence in Syria and 
Palestine. Another major event which shaped Egyptian foreign policy was the withdrawal 
of British forces. Nasser's agreement with the British in 1954, on troop withdrawals served 
as a watershed event. It opened the door to a more assertive Egyptian regional posture 
by removing the constraints that had existed while Cairo was negotiating its 
independence. 63 
62 Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt After Nasser. Sadat, Peace and the Mirage 
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Four events led Nasser to move in 1955 and 1956, toward a foreign policy that 
found its main justification in the ideologies of Arab nationalism and nonalignment: 
• the Baghdad Pact, 
• Egyptian-Israeli military clashes in Gaza and the subsequent 
Czech arms deal, 
• the nonaligned summit in Bandung, 
• and the Suez Crisis. 64 
To Nasser, the Baghdad Pact appeared to be little more than a British attempt at 
securing concessions from Iraq that they were unable to obtain from Egypt. When 
combined with the sense that Egypt had just freed themselves from their colonial master, 
this made Egypt vehemently opposed to the Pact. The border clashes between Egypt and 
Israel drew Egypt into ~at had been previously an unplanned direction. The loss of 
Egyptian forces, transformed Nasser's ambivalent attitude towards Israel, into one which 
supported a more aggressive foreign policy. At the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 
April, 1955, Nasser concluded that nonalignment made sense, and that pursuing such a 
policy would make him a key player among the leaders of the Third World. Nasser also 
theorized that pursuing a policy of nonalignment would gain Egypt widespread support 
from the large number of newly emerging African, and Asian, states that identified with 
nonalignment. The Suez Crisis in 1956, was signjficant in that it put Nasser at the center 
of the world stage, seizing the imagination of the Egypt.ian people and of Muslims 
evef)'VIA1ere. In fact, Nasser remarked that it was not until the Suez crisis that Egyptians 
64 lbid., 27. 
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began to take Arabism seriously.65 The emerging Egyptian self image, as the leader of the 
Arab v,orld, became a dominant force driving Egyptian foreign policy . The advent of the 
Eisenhower doctrine in 1957, strengthened the conservative governments surrounding 
Syria, and motivated a Syrian call for Arab unity. This U.S. doctrine which pledged 
financial aid to any Middle Eastem govemment threatened by overt armed aggression from 
any nation controlled by international communism. 
Nasser was becoming a victim of his own rhetoric, any failure to answer the call for 
a Egyptian-Syrian union, would result in a loss of legitimacy. The ill-conceived union 
between Egypt and Syria which materialized in 1958, was short lived, and collapsed by 
1961. In 1967, Nasser's desire to prove his Arab credentials, drew Egypt into conflict with 
Israel. Palestinian raids from Jordan resulted in Israeli reprisals against Jordan, and 
criticism for Egypt's lack of action. Anwar Sadat wrote in his memoirs, "Nasser gave 
orders for the Tiran Strait to be closed, and the United Nations Emergency Force to be 
withdrawn, knowing that war was a one hundred percent certainty. "66 Nasser's foreign 
policy was built on the tvvo pillars of nonalignment and Nasser's desire to lead the Arab 
vvorld. Although, pragmatic and willing to accept assistance where ever he could find it, 
with little concem for the ideology of would be patrons, Egypt's repeated military defeats 
thrust Egypt into a state of military and economic dependency. 
65 Ibid., 29. 
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Upon his death in 1970, although immortalized by the Egyptian people, Nasser left his 
successor a legacy of military and economic decay. 
C. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT (1952-1970) 
Between 1952, and 1970, the United States provided Egypt with a minimal level of 
security assistance. Between May 25, 1950, and December 31, 1955, the United States 
exported only $ 1.2 million in arms and $6.1 million in spare parts and aircraft to Egypt. 67 
Offers of U.S. military aid coincided with the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Suez 
Canal zone and the Alpha Project, (a U.S. proposed Arab-Israeli peace settlement). In 
August of 1954, the United States offered Egypt $20 million in military aid tied to progress 
toward an Egyptian-Israeli Peace accord. However, this offer never came to fruition, as 
a result of Nasser's acceptance of a Soviet arms offer known as the Czech Arms Deal in 
·1955. Once the Soviet Union became Egypt's principle supplier, military aid was 
discarded as a U.S. foreign policy tool with regards to Egypt. Egyptian allegiance with the 
Soviet Union effectively prevented any future U.S. military aid to Egypt until the 1970's. 
D. EVALUATION _OF U.S. INFLUENCE 
The success or failure of U.S. security assistance as a source of influence is 
determined by the degree to which the behavior of a recipient conforms to that desired by 
the United States. However, when evaluating the degree to which military assistance has 
influenced Egypt, many factors must be taken into account. These factors include but are 
not limited to, the type of influence applied, existing Egyptian foreign policy, availability of 
67 Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 33. 
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an alternate supplier, the cost of Egyptian compliance, and the history of U.S.-Egyptian 
relations. 
Washington's efforts in the early 1950's, to exchange promises of arms to Egypt for 
U.S. influence, represented a U.S. attempt to probe the capabilittes and limitations of arms 
transfers as an instrument of foreign policy. The efforts of the Eisenhower Administration 
at utilizing arms transfer as a source of influence, although, achieving a some successes, 
were generally viewed as a failure. The experiences of the Eisenhower Administration in 
the early 1950's, did ho'~Never, provide many important lessons. The first lesson was the 
importance of the credibility of U.S. military assistance. Egyptian skepticism as to the 
credibility of U.S. arms offers, led President Nasser to search out the Soviet Union as an 
alternate arms supplier. The failure of the Eisenhower Administration to r~cognize the 
possible consequence associated with denying Egypt arms, served as an object lesson 
for future administrations. Through the failures of the EisenhoVJer administration it became 
apparent that the projected magnitude of proposed military aid must be commensurate 
with the risks involved supporting U.S. objectives. Additionally, the delays, restrictions 
and uncertainties \Nhich are an unavoidable part of the military aid process must be taken 
into account. In an environment with other potential suppliers unburdened by legislative 
requirements and a complex aid machinery, recipients must be rewarded for thejr 
forbearance. The Eisenhower Administration tried, in Barry Rubin's words, "to convince 
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the Egyptians to do too much with too little benefit for the already suspicious Free 
Officers."68 Early U.S. efforts to influence Egypt through arms transfers proved ineffectual. 
They had limited success in facilitating U.S. goals. 
The only notable attempt by the United States to exchange arms for influence was 
the agreement between Britain and Egypt in 1954, calling for the removal of British troops 
from the Suez Canal Zone. While arms were provided to Egypt for their support of this 
agreement there is no definitive evidence that the provision of U.S. arms influenced 
Egypt's decision to sign the agreement. The success of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian 
Agreement, may be attributed to the presence of mutual interests, rather than the result 
of U.S. influence. Nasser's desire for greater autonomy combined with British efforts to 
reduce Middle East military obligations ultimately led to the signing of the agreement. 
During the period 1952 to 1970, arms transfers to Egypt failed to be a viable source 
of U.S. influence, or an effective tool with vvhich to achieve foreign policy goals. The U.S. 
failure was attributed to dominant image of American policy making during this period. 
U.S. officials continually confused their O'Ml view of vvhat Egyptian priorities should be with 
the real priorities of the Nasser regime. 69 
The death of Gamal Nasser in 1970 ended the first phase of Egyptian foreign 
policy. The rise to power of Anwar Sadat marked the beginning of a new phase of U.S.-
68 lbid. 
69 Bums, Economic Aid and American Policy Towards Egypt, 211. 
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Egyptian Relations. Chapter IV examines the second phase of U.S.-Egyptian relations 
from 1970 to 1981. 
61 
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IV. PHASE II (1970-1981) 
This chapter examines the second historical phase of U.S.-Egyptian security 
assistance relations. The motivating forces of both Egyptian and U.S. foreign policy are 
discussed, along with the level of U.S. security assistance. U.S. efforts to influence 
Egyptian foreign and domestic behavior through arms transfers are then evaluated. 
A. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FROM NIXON TO REAGAN 
The early 1970's witnessed tM:> events vvhich influenced U.S. foreign policy. These 
events were the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, and the OPEC oil price rise of 1974.70 In 
response to the experiences of Vietnam, President Nixon developed the Nixon doctrine. 
This doctrine represented an attempt to shift some of America's global defense 
responsibilities to "surrogate gendarmes" in the Third World. 71 This, in conjunction with 
the dramatic rise in the price of oil in 1974, led to a major drive to increase U.S. exports 
to the oil-producing countries of the Middle East and reduce U.S. dependence on foreign 
oil. Although the Nixon doctrine represented a new strategy for supporting U.S. interests 
in the Middle East, it was essentially a continuation of the efforts of previous 
administrations, vvhich was to focus on addressing Soviet expansionism in the region and 
promoting peace between Israel and the Arabs. Nixon's Middle East foreign policy was 
centered around three significant goals. His first goal was to minimize the prospects of 
7
° Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 40. 
71 1bid. 
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further major armed conflict between Arabs and Israelis. The second goal was to remove 
the Soviets from the region and deny them access to regional mititary base facilities. The 
final goal was to guarantee continued U.S. access to the oil it and its allies required by 
removing the cause for embargo and lessening Soviet means of interfering.72 Nixon 
professed, especially in the early stages of each of his two terms, to follow an 
"evenhanded," or "balanced policy," toward Egypt. 73 
With the resignation of President Nixon on August 9, 197 4, Gerald Ford became 
President During Ford's term as president, there were few changes to U.S. Middle East 
foreign poficy. President Ford's commitment to continuity in foreign _policy was evident in 
his retention of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. It was not until the Carter 
administration that U.S. Middle East foreign policy strategy shifted. 
Like his predecessors, President Carter was aware of and strove to counteract the 
Soviet threat to the United States in the Middle East, but this goal was conceived by him 
in light of another priority: respect for human rights, on a global scale. President Carter 
engaged himself deeply in the problems of the Middle East. In dealing with the Middle 
East, Carter's foreign policy efforts center on answering three principle challenges: the 
Camp David negotiations, the Iranian revolution including the hostage crisis, and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While faced with these three challenges, President Carter 
72 lewis Sorley, Arms Transfers under Nixon: A Policy Analysis 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 42. 
73 George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 140. 
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is most remembered on the positive side for his efforts to produce a peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel. Unlike his predecessor, Carter enunciated a new principle to govern 
U.S. arms export decision making: rather than view military exports as a normal instrument 
of U.S. foreign policy, he viewed arms transfers as an exceptional foreign implement, to 
be used only in instances vvhere it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer 
contributes to U.S. national security interests.74 However, despite President Carter's 
classification of security assistance as an exceptional foreign instrument, the provision of 
U.S. military aid was instrumental in gaining Egyptian acceptance of the Camp David 
Accords. 
B. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SADAT 
Anwar Sadat after taking office, was faced with an ambiguous Egyptian foreign 
policy, v.tlich he inherited from Nasser. For the first three years of his presidency, Sadat 
remained within the shadow of Nasser, and was heavily influenced by Nasser's policies 
and personality. Sadat, although benefiting from the consolidation of povver within the 
office of the president during Nasser's reign, possessed a style of leadership that was 
distinctly different from that of Nasser. By 197 4, Sadat had concluded, that the foreign 
policy failures of Nasser's last years stemmed in part from Nasser's close alignment with 
socialist states - states whose values were at odds with Egypt's conservative traditions. 
Sadat outlined what he was to can his "Corrective Revolution" in The October Working 
Paper of 197 4. This declaration stated the philosophical basis for his revolution. 
74 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 43. 
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The real challenge confronting peoples with deep-rooted origins who are 
facing the problem of civilizational progress is precisely how to renovate 
their civilization. They should not reject the past in the name of the present 
and should not renounce the modem in the name of the past, but they 
should take of the new with out losing sight of their origins. 75 
Sadat was categorized as a pragmatist, a realist with little attachment to grand 
theories and ideologies.76 He was essentially anti-Communist, and anti-Soviet. However, 
insofar as their position toward the Middle East was concerned, he saw no difference 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Unlike Nasser, who saw the Arab world 
as Egypt's natural sphere of influence, Sadat saw Egypt's leadership position as a 
structural property, and not a behavioral attribute. Furthermore, he believed this was a 
property that could not be challenged or taken away. n Egyptian general foreign policy 
objectives in the 1970's, as articulated, and acted upon by Sadat, were as follows: 
• the restoration, preferably by negotiation, of Egyptian territories occupied by 
Israel since 1967 (As a consequence, when Sadat's February 1971 peace 
plan failed, the only option left was war,), 
• the termination of the war with Israel, as the economic costs had become 
bearable, 
• the improvement of relations with Washington, as the United States was the 
only country that could influence Israel, 
75 Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs, 115. 
76 Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hilla! Dessouki, The Foreign Policies of Arab 
States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 129. 
77 Ibid., 130. 
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• the rejuvenation and modernization of the economy through the importation of 
Western technology and private capital, 
• the modification of Egypt's global and regional policies in order to better 
pursue these objectives. 78 
Both Nasser, and Sadat, had foreign policy challenges. Nasser had brought about 
the evacuation of the British, while Sadat set in motion the process of recovering the Sinai 
after the 1973 War. Under Sadat the return of the occupied territory became the 
cornerstone of Egyptian foreign policy, and every other action was judged according to its 
impact on that goal. While heavily relying on outside assistance, Sadat followed his own 
instincts v.tlen the strategies or tactics of a patron differed from his own. The nature of his 
relationship with the United States was often deceptive. At times, Sadat in order to 
generate in U.S. leaders a sense of indebtedness and commitment to the peace process, 
deliberately magnified the 'extent of Egyptian dependence on the United States . 79 As early 
as 1973, in his first meeting with Henry Kissinger, as part of his famous "shuttle 
diplomacy'', Sadat talked about a common strategy between Egypt and the United States 
to remove Soviet influence from the Middle East. Sadat's strategic vision was later 
expanded to encompass a local, triangular, hegemony in the Middle East. Sadat was 
essentially proposing that Egypt become a third regional pillar, essentially restructuring 
President Nixon's twin pillar policy.80 However, even with Sadat's overtures to 
Washington, v.tlere sovereignty concerns were involved, Sadat drew a firm line. Finally, 
78 lbid., 129. 
79 Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs, 116. 
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Sadat's participation in the peace process, was more out of necessity, than any desire to 
appease the United States. Sadat's decision to go to Israel in November of 1977, was a 
political gamble, prompted by his frustration over Arab disunity, increasing economic 
problems at home (January food riots), and U.S. impatience with the push and pull of Arab 
politics.81 Sadat's peace overtures, although well received at home, resulted in suspension 
of Egypfs membership in the League of Arab States, after the Egyptian signed the. 1979 
Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, although initially well received in Egypt, 
led to his assassination by right wing Egyptians in 1981. 
C. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT (1970-1981) 
It was during the second phase of U.S.-Egyptian relations that significant progress 
was made in aligning Egypt with the United States. Egyptian efforts to distance 
themselves from the Soviet Union, leading up to and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 
opened the door for U.S. military aid. U.S. arms came slowly and gradually. In 1975, after 
the signature of the second disengagement agreement, Egypt bought six C-130 transport 
air planes. By the summer of 1977, fourteen additional C-130s, and twelve 
reconnaissance drones were provided to Egypt, at an estimated value of $251 million. 
Military relations developed at an unprecedented rate after President Sadat made his 
historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977. In February 1978, President Carter authorized the sale 
of fifty F-5Es to Egypt as part of an overall jet package to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. 82 
81 Ibid., 142. 
82 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 45. 
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The value of U.S. arms sales to Egypt rose from $68.4 million in 1976, to $937.3 million 
by 1979.83 After the collapse of the Arab Military Industrial Organization (AMIO) in 
October, 1979, Egypt and the United States agreed to cooperate in manufacturing and 
assembling of armored vehicles and electronic equipment.84 Additionally, 1979, was 
significant in that it was the first year since 1955, that the Soviet bloc was not Egypt's 
primary supplier of military equipment.85 1n 1980, three U.S. training exercises were held 
on Egyptian soil. The first exercise held in January was a U.S. exercise aimed at 
practicing contingencies, reportedly in response to events in Iran and Afghanistan. The 
second operation, code named Proud Phantom, was a joint U.S.:-Egyptian air combat 
exercise. In November, 1980, U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces, including approximately 
1,400 troops and eight A-7 tactical ground-support planes, participated in a two week 
exercise in Egypt. This exercise, called Bright Star, was significant in that it was the first 
time the U.S. RDF operated in the Middle Eastern deserts, highlighting a number of U.S. 
operational and equipment problems. 
It was during this period that the United States developed the IMET program. 
Although, in the previous period, 1952 to 1970, while the United States provided training 
to foreign military personnel under the MAP, no Egyptians received U.S. military training. 
It was not until 1978, that Egypt began receiving U.S. military training under the IMET 
83 Samuel F. Wells and Mark A. Bruzonsky, eds., Security in the Middle 
East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 79. 
84 1bid. 
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program. From 1978, to 1981, two hundred and sixty Egyptians received training under 
the I MET program at a cost of $ 2.1 million dollars. 86 
D. EVALUATION OF INFLUENCE 
The sale of U.S. transport aircraft to Egypt in 1975 and 1977, not only served to 
initiate an active U.S.-Egyptian military aid relationship, but can be viewed as a U.S .. 
attempt to exercise structural influence. Congressional hearings held to discuss these 
aircraft sales outlined the rationale for the transfer of U.S. military equipment. Nicholas 
Veliotes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated that 
the proposed sale would not effect the regional balance of power. By improving Egyptian 
capability for collection of information, and for movement of troops and supplies, the items 
would enhance regional stability."87 In conjunction with this statement, General Fish 
added that the aircraft provided to Egypt could not be used offensively without significant 
modifications, which in his opinion could only be made with further U.S. assistance. 88 
The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty that was signed on March 26, 1979, was heralded as a 
spectacular U.S. diplomatic achievement, largely attributed to U.S. influence derived from 
86 Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military 
Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts: As of 
September 30, 1992, Washington, D.C.: FMS Control and Reports Division 
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arms transfer to both signatory nations. More than two weeks prior to the signing of the 
historic treaty on the White House lawn, U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown met with the 
Defense Ministers of both Egypt and Israel to negotiate the contents of the U.S. arms 
packages each of the treaty nation were to receive. Egypt received $1.5 billion in arms 
credits, and on July 8, the Carter administration announced it had agreed to sell Egypt 35 
F--4-E Phantom fighter bombers, along with several hundred air-to-air and air-to-surface 
missiles, for an estimated $594 million.89 The link between U.S. promises of security 
assistance and Egyptian acceptance of the peace treaty was articulated by American 
Ambassador to Egypt, Herman Eilts, shortly after the treaty was signed. Eilts stated, "that 
the American promise of increased military aid to Egypt was significant in persuading 
President Sadat to accept the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty even though he 
knew these documents were deficient in expressing Egyptian commitment to the overall 
Arab cause."90 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig's visit to Egypt in April, 1981 , served as a further 
test of the United States' ability influence Egypt through increased arms transfers. Haig 
attempted to convince Sadat to sign an agreement making the Ras Banas base available 
to the U.S. Army. Sadat, although refusing to sign a formal agreement, pledged to make 
facilities available to the United States in response to a request by any member of the Arab 
89 Quandt, The United States and Egypt, 143. 
90 Adet Safty, From Camp David To The Gu/f(NewYork: Black Rose 
Books, 1992), 105. 
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League. 91 Although demonstrating a clear reluctance to yield on the issue of formal basing 
rights for U.S. troops, U.S. influence paved the way for joint training exercises in Egypt. 
91 Wells and Bruzonsky, Security in the Middle East, 79. 
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V. PHASE Ill (1981-1994) 
This chapter examines the last historical phase of U.S.-Egyptian security assistance 
relations. The motivating forces of both Egyptian and U.S. foreign policy are discussed, 
along with the level of U.S. security assistance. U.S. efforts to influence Egyptian foreign 
and domestic behavior through arms transfers are then evaluated. 
A. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FROM REAGAN TO CLINTON 
U.S. foreign policy objectives from the Reagan administration to the Clinton 
administration have been profoundly effected by world events. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, and the success of the Gulf War, prompted a redirection of U.S. foreign 
policy, away from the previous policy of containment under Reagan to a policy centered 
around enlargement under Clinton. 
U.S. foreign policy objectives under the Reagan and Bush administrations were 
essentially carried forward from the previous administrations, with the exception of Carter's 
emphasis on human rights. U.S. objectives in the Middle East continued to include; 
support for the Arab-Israeli peace process, the protection of U.S. access to regional 
resources, and containment of the Soviet Union. However, U.S. Middle East arms transfer 
policy, under Reagan, while appearing to represent a complete reversal of the arms 
transfer policy prescribed by the previous Carter administration, represented a 
continuation of the actual arms transfer practices endorsed by Carter. Arms transfers, 
W"lile in practice were always viewed as a valuable instrument of foreign policy, once again 
were heralded publicly. The 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and subsequent 
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Gulf War was heralded as reaffirmation of the utility of an open arms transfer policy. The 
defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the election of a new 
U.S. president, served as the impetus for a new U.S. foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy 
shifted from a policy focusing on containment of the Soviet Union to a policy focusing on 
enlargement. 
The Clinton enlargement policy focuses on four general objectives; (1) 
strengthening the community of major market democracies, (2) fostering new democracies 
· and market economies, (3) countering "backlash" states, and (4) supporting the 
acceptance of international human rights. 92 
B. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MUBARAK 
After the assassination of President Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's vice president, 
assumed the leadership of Egypt after receiving overwhelming support in a national 
referendum on October 24, 1981.93 Mubarak, with minimal experience in the struggle for 
power, and little taste for the VvOrld stage, adopted a pragmatic approach to foreign affairs 
that parted ways with both his predecessors. He currently represents the middle ground. 
He has allowed more overt political activity, (when compared to the oppressiveness of 
Sadat), and immediately upon taking office pledged to honor the peace treaty with Israel. 
Mubarak, like his predecessors, realizes the importance of improving the quality of 
Egyptian life and acquiring foreign aid. Unlike his predecessors, Mubarak seems eager 
92 Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," DISAM Jouma/12, 
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to open up the Egyptian political system as a way of building his own legitimacy, and is far · 
more responsive to Egyptian public opinion. 94 He is less inclined than Sadat to draw 
special attention to the special relationship with Washington. Mubarak, like the Egyptian 
leaders that came before him, continues to demonstrate Egyptian reluctance to alignment. 
With the independence and territorial integrity of Egypt secured by his predecessors, 
Mubarak faced the challenge of bringing normalcy to Arab reactions. 
C. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT (1981-1994) 
The decade of the 1980's saw an unprecedented flow of military resources from the 
United States to the Middle East. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the subsequent loss 
of the Iran as a regional surrogate, led the United States to seek out a new regional 
partner. Egypt as one of the region's moderate Arab states, with its important geographic 
location, found itself the focus of U.S. efforts to cultivate a new regional partner. From 
bases in Egypt the United State's hoped to continue to play an active role in the Middle 
East. 
Egypt whose participation in the anti-Iraq coalition was considered critical, was 
rewarded by the Bush administration through the cancellation of $ 7 billion dollars in 
Egyptian military debt to the United States. This sum represented all the outstanding U.S. 
loans Egypt had dating back to the early 1980's. Beyond this considerable financial 
windfall, Egypt was allowed to purchase over $2 billion in new U.S. arms on credit from the 
94 Quandt, The United States and Egypt , 19. 
75 
fall of 1990 to through the summer of 1991.95 In April of 1994 the Clinton Administration, 
reversing U.S. policy, permitted Mississippi's Ingalls Shipbuilding to begin talks on 
constructing diesel submarines, worth $ 350 million each for Egypt. 96 Earlier this same 
year the United States gave Egypt free of charge , 700 M-60 tanks from the aging , but 
still lethal Cold War arsenal.97 
In 1991, arms agreements signed between Egypt and the United States totalted 
$2.3 billion. Most of this totaf was due to an Egyptian purchase of forty-six F-16 CID 
fighter aircraft. 98 In conjunction with the dramatic increase in FMS to Egypt during this 
period, a corresponding increase occurred in the number of Egyptian students trained 
under the IMET program. From 1981 to 1994,2,247 Egyptian students were trained under 
the IMET program, at a cost of approximately$ 21 million.99 
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D. EVALUATION OF INFLUENCE 
The ability of the United States to influence Egyptian behavior through military aid 
during the current phase of U.S.-Egyptian relations has produced mixed results. These 
mixed results bring into question the viability of U.S. security assistance as a source of 
influence. Three major events vvhich occurred during this period are discussed along with 
the role U.S. influence played. The utility of the FMS and IMET programs are also be 
discussed in terms of their ability to support current U.S. goals as outlined by President 
Clinton's policy of enlargement. 
A key event in 1982 that demonstrated the inability of U.S. military aid to influence 
Egyptian foreign policy decisions, was the recall of the Egyptian ambassador to Israel. 
After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the apparent Israeli complicity in the massacres 
by Lebanese forces of Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatilla refuge camps in 
September, President Hosni Mubarak withdrew Egypfs ambassador from Tel Aviv. Even 
in the face of constant U.S. congressional pressure, a new Egyptian ambassador was not 
sent to Israel until 1986.100 During this same period, the United States signed FMS 
agreements with Egypt totaling over $2.3 billion. 101 In view of the fact, that this incident 
occurred only three years after Camp David, it appears that U.S. efforts to tie military aid 
to Egyptian acquiescence in Israeli actions was limited. 
100 Quandt, The United States and Egypt, 9. 
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Another incident which highlighted the inability of U.S. security assistance to 
generate Egyptian support for U.S. interests was the October 7, 1985, Achille Lauro 
hijacking. Egyptian President Mubarak attempted to bar the United States from bringing 
the hijackers to trial, by secretly attempting to fly the accused hijackers to Tunis, even after 
learning of the killing of an American passenger. 102 In this instance, Egypt was more 
concerned with being viewed as supporting the Palestinians in the eyes of the Arab world 
than supporting U.S. interests. 
The third test of U.S. influence during this period was the 1991 Gulf War. Egyptian 
support of the U.S. led coalition was attributed to U.S. efforts to exert bargaining 
influence. In exchange for Egyptian participation, President Bush promised to cancel the 
$ 7 billion Egypt owed the United States for past FMS purchases and authorize an 
additional$ 2 billion of FMS credit. Although U.S. influence is claimed to have been the 
major reason for Egyptian support, Egyptian interests can not be neglected. Egyptian 
President Mubarak initially attempted to diffuse the Iraq-Kuwait situation by playing a 
mediating role. However, with the failure of his mediation efforts, he was left with little 
choice but to condemn Iraqi actions, in effort to save face in the Arab world. 103 
Furthermore, Mubarak believed that by not condemning Iraqi actions, foreign intervention 
was guaranteed. Egyptian economic concerns were another driving force behind their 
decision to join the coalition forces. Remittances from the approximately two miiHon 
102 Quandt, The United States and Egypt, 22. 
103 Adel Safty, From Camp David to the Gulf, 203. 
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Egyptians working in the Gulf countries constitute the single largest source of Egyptian 
foreign currency earnings. 104 
The final point that will be examined is the degree to which influence derived from 
security assistance efforts has supported the objectives outlined in President Clinton's 
enlargement policy. The two elements of the enlargement policy which will be addressed 
are the recognition of human rights and economic development. 
The Egypt Constitution provides for various human rights, including a multiparty 
political system, regular elections, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, freedom of 
opinion, and the right to peaceful private assembly. 105 Many of these rights have been 
severely restricted since Emergency Law was implemented immediately after the 
assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981.106 Billions of dollars vvorth of security assistance 
grants, and the education of hundreds of Egyptian officers since 1982, has failed to bring 
about the restoration of many basic human rights in Egypt. Egyptian efforts to combat 
Islamic fundamentalism have resulted in the detention of thousands of Egyptians without 
formal charges, the circumvention of the regular court system by trying civilians suspected 
of terrorism in military courts, and virtual government control of the press. In light of the 
active role the government plays in regulating the press, the Egyptian media continues to 
print anti-American statements. While, the provision of U.S. security assistance appears 
104 U.S. Department of State, Egyptian Human Rights Practices, 1994 (February 1995), 1. 
105 Ibid. 
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to have little effect on Egyptian recognition of human rights, significant progress has been 
made on the economic front. 
The Egyptian Government is continuing its U.S. supported economic reform 
program. U.S.-Egyptian trade relations have remained strong. The United States 
continued to be Egypt's leading trading partner, providing twenty-seven percent of its 
imports and receiving six percent of its exports.107 
107 Tom Sams, "Government Slowly Pursues Economic Reform Program," 
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine how the United States influences 
Egyptian behavior through the FMS and IMET programs. An examination of the FMS 
program revealed the four basic elements of· this program which serve to influence 
Egyptian behavior. The FMS process leads to the development of numerous personal 
relationships at all governmental levels between the United States and Egypt. Egyptian 
reliance on U.S. weapons and assistance in determining their security requirements has 
enabled the United States to guide the direction of Egyptian military development. 
Through manipulation of delivery schedules and financing terms, influence can be exerted. 
·Finally, the FMS process does as any arms acquisition or sales project, makes Egypt 
dependent on further U.S. assistance or sales, and is thus a source of continuing U.S. 
influence. 
The dependency relationship established as a result of the FMS program and the 
IMET program represents a U.S. investment which will serve as a source of future 
influence. The IMET program influences the potential future leaders of Egypt through 
providing officers exposure to the U.S. lifestyle, training which stresses U.S. values, and 
fostering the development of close personal relationships between Egyptian officers and 
their U.S. counterparts. 
In answering the research question - " How does the United States influence Egypt 
through the FMS and IMET programs? - " the efficacy of past U.S. efforts to influence 
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Egypt were examined. This research identified four elements which have affected either 
the success or failure of U.S. influence. 
U.S. attempts to influence Egypt were most successful when both the nations 
shared mutual interests. The 1979 Camp David Accords and Egyptian participation in the 
Gulf war serve to highlight this point. Although, the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty 
failed to meet an of President Sadat's political objectives, a U.S. offer of military aid proved 
instrumental in Sadat's acceptance of the peace treaty. The 1991 Gulf War served as 
another example supporting this point. U.S. and Egyptian mutual concerns over Saddam 
Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, in conjunction with the U.S. waving of$ 7 biflion of Egyptian 
FMS debt and approval of $64 million of additional FMS, led to Egypt's support of U.S. led 
coalition forces. 
Instances in YJhich ·the United States has attempted to influence Egyptian behavior 
through the provision of security assistance without considering the possible negative cost 
of Egyptian compliance have ended in failure. U.S. attempts to gain permanent basing 
rights in Egypt have been repeatedly viewed as a threat to Egypt's sovereignty and have 
been opposed by the Egyptian population. As a result they have achieved mixed success. 
Egyptian concerns over the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt have dominated 
Egyptian domestic decision making, seriously undermining U.S. efforts to influence 
Egyptian human rights behavior. 
The United States must recognize the limitations assodated with the use of security 
assistance as a tool for modifying Egyptian foreign or domestic behavior. Egyptian 
behavior is the product of their geography, culture and thousands of years of history. U.S. 
82 
attempts to modify Egyptian human rights behavior through the FMS and I MET programs 
have proven to be largely unsuccessful. Egypt has remained under Emergency Law since 
1981 and continues to deny its citizens many basic human rights. 
The influence derived from the FMS and IMET programs, in the Egyptian case, is 
best suited for attaining short term goals, as opposed to long term goals or the 
continuation of existing behavior. FMS to Egypt have facilitated Egyptian support for U.S. 
contingency operations in the Middle East on a case by case basis. Egyptian logistical 
support for the 1979 U.S. hostage rescue attempt and U.S. efforts to aid the Afghan rebels 
during the war in Afghanistan, serve as examples. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States continues to view security assistance as a significant source of 
U.S. interest. Ho'Never, questions continue to persist as to its utility. The influence derived 
through the transfer of military hardware and training is an area of study that requires 
additional research to expand the available knowledge in the field. 
Based on the belief that grant security assistance produces a greater level of 
influence, than that derived from cash sales of arms. The case of Egypt should be the 
optimal case. Since 1988, annual security assistance grants to Egypt have averaged $1.3 
billion dollars. In light of the magnitude of these annual grants of aid to Egypt, additional 
research is warranted to study whether the United States would be better served to limit 
arm sales to Egypt to cash sates. 
Historically, the United States appears to have achieved the same level of influence 
over Egyptian behavior, while providing grant assistance at levels which were less than 
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half of the current levels. There appears to be little correlation between the level of 
assistance and the degree of U.S. influence. The current level of military aid provided 
Egypt should be reviewed. 
Furthermore, with regards to U.S. influence derived from the IMET program, a 
longer period of study is required to evaluate the results of this program. Additionally, 
greater emphasis must be placed on tracking the career paths of international military 
students trained in the United States. 
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